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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most of economics can be summarized in four words:
People respond to incentives. The rest is commentary.
[Landsburg (1995) p. 3 ]
This citation of Landsburg shows that peoples reactions to incentives
constitute one of the most important characteristics of economic theory which
goes along with a very specic idea of man. This typical homo economicus
acts egoistically such that he always seeks to maximize his own utility. Under
the assumption that people behave purely selshly the implementation of
optimal (monetary) incentives seems to be a relevant question not only in
politics or social life but also in organizations.
This thesis is concerned with the impact of monetary incentives in rms.
This issue has attracted a lot of attention in recent decades. Not only the-
oretical (for seminal papers see e.g. Holmström (1979), Grossman and Hart
(1983), Hart and Holmström (1987)) but also empirical researchers (e.g.
Paarsch and Shearer (1999), Lazear (2000), Shearer (2004)) have made a
huge e¤ort in exploring the optimal contract design and its actual e¤ects
on e¤ort exertion. For this purpose the relationship between employer and
employee and the resulting divergence of interests has been analyzed. How-
ever, more recently several empirical papers have provided evidence that the
image of the homo economicus is all too simple and does not display all hu-
man traits which are important in practice. In particular the positive e¤ect
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of incentives could not always be conrmed (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini
(2000a), Heyman and Ariely (2004), Fehr and Gächter (2002)). These de-
viating ndings cannot be explained by standard economic theory alone as
they represent psychological rather than economic aspects of decision mak-
ing. Among the rst to add psychological elements to standard neoclassic
preferences were Geanakoplos et al. (1989) or Rabin (1993), who tried to
increase the explanatory power of the economic theory.
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate whether a particular
action taken by the employer indeed triggers the desired behavior of the em-
ployee and what motivational mechanisms underlie the employees behavior
when it does not. Each of the subsequent chapters deals with a specic as-
pect of the incentive problems that arise in organizations. These research
questions are analyzed theoretically and experimentally.
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the impact of di¤erent compensation schemes
on the e¤ort decision. One of the most intuitive and therefore widespread
types of incentives is the introduction of performance-dependent compen-
sation in the form of a piece rate. In Chapter 2 we examine the impact
of varying piece rates on work performance in an economic experiment. If
people react according to the standard homo economicus higher piece rates
should ceteris paribus lead to higher e¤ort levels. We use two simple real
e¤ort tasks to check the validity of this hypothesis. However, we do not nd
a monotonically increasing relationship between performance and strength of
incentives but an inversely U-shaped pattern. This contrasts not only with
standard economic theory but also with observations in a previous real e¤ort
experiment presented in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a). To give a possible
explanation for our ndings we develop a simple theoretical model including
reference dependency and loss aversion into the employees preferences. This
approach captures the idea of individuals who do not only consider their
absolute monetary payo¤s but evaluate them compared to reference wage
and was rst established by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In case of refer-
ence dependent and loss averse agents there is a non-monotonic relationship
between incentives and performance and therefore high powered incentives
might even lead to decreasing e¤ort levels.
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However, if reference dependency and loss aversion are general traits of
human preferences and hence inuence individual decision making, the xed
part of the compensation also plays a crucial role in setting optimal incen-
tives. This is especially important considering that the xed base salary often
constitutes a large part of the total compensation (see e.g. Murphy (1999)).
Although simple principal agent models would lead us to predict that the
xed wage does not a¤ect the employees optimal e¤ort choice, the model
including reference dependency and loss aversion demonstrates a weakly de-
creasing relationship between the height of the xed wage and employee
performance. In contrast to this recent economic experiments in particular
those exploring the gift exchange game have been able to show that indi-
viduals exert e¤ort above the theoretically optimal level for increasing xed
wages despite the absence of any incentives (see e.g. Berg et al. (1995), Fehr
et al. (1993), Gächter and Falk (2002)).
In Chapter 3 we develop alternative hypotheses on this question and in-
vestigate actual human behavior where we again use a real e¤ort task. For
this purpose we rewarded all participants with the same performance de-
pendent piece rate but exposed them to three di¤erently high xed wages.
Surprisingly, we observe the highest e¤ort levels with the low and the high
xed wage. The worst performance, however, is provided under an inter-
mediate xed wage. This outcome can neither be explained by standard
preferences nor by reference dependency and loss aversion alone. As social
preferences and social norms have been shown to have an important e¤ect on
individual decision making (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), Engelmann and Strobel (2004)),
we argue that it is likely that subjects in the experiment were also led by a
social norm demanding a certain e¤ort level with a very high xed wage.
Social norms seem to play an important role in particular when people
interact with each other. Chapters 4 and 5 therefore deal with incentive
problems with social interaction. In team production fairness considerations
often refer to the colleagues or team mates.
In Chapter 4 we use this idea to provide an explanation for the peer
pressure phenomenon which has been shown to increase individual contribu-
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tions in team production. For this purpose we develop a two-period model
in which the two team members are inequity averse regarding their noisy
contributions. We nd that the e¤ect of inequity aversion strongly depends
on the informational setting. For hidden contributions the agents act as if
they were purely selsh. However, when contributions are made transparent
at an interim stage the agents adjust their second period e¤ort levels accord-
ing to the intermediate information they received. That is the agent with
higher past contribution will decrease his future contribution and vice versa
in order to counterbalance the di¤erence between each other. Anticipating
this adaption the agents exert higher e¤ort in the rst period to increase the
counterparts e¤ort adjustment in the second. This form of peer pressure
leads to a reduction in free-riding and thus to more e¢ cient outcomes.
Similar to the previous chapters we check the theoretical results in a real
e¤ort experiment observing strong evidence for the conclusion that trans-
parency indeed leads to a considerable e¤ort adjustment such that inequity
in contributions is reduced. Yet, the team matesabsolute e¤ort adjustments
do not seem to be equal irrespective of whether a subject contributed more or
less than his counterpart in the previous period. Instead we nd asymmetric
adjustments which are higher for subjects who have taken the lead in the
preceding period and lower for those having made lower contributions. Still,
the results show that obviously the occurrence of a social norm together with
transparent conditions leads to higher aggregate outputs.
Setting incentives in employer-employee relationships is often very sensi-
tive to the agents productivity or ability. A standard assumption in economic
theory is that the agent has better information on his own ability than the
principal. One of the most famous solutions to this asymmetry in informa-
tion is job market signaling (see Spence (1973)). But, if an agent joins a rm
directly after leaving university or changes to a new job it also seems pos-
sible that the principal or supervisor has a better perception of the agents
actual ability for the specic tasks corresponding to the job. If this is the
case the agent might be interested in the information the principal has when
considering which e¤ort level to exert.
In Chapter 5 we theoretically and experimentally examine a situation in
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which the principal has better information about the agents ability than the
agent himself does. The principal can inform the agent about his ability by
giving him performance feedback but there might be incentives for her to
lie about it. Analyzing a simple signaling model yields the following main
results: The principal tells the truth if there are su¢ ciently high costs of
lying. When the principals marginal returns on the agents e¤ort increases,
deception is more likely to occur.
We observed ambiguity, however, when testing these theoretical results
in a lab experiment with abstract e¤ort choices. On one hand, the data
provide evidence implying that subjects indeed su¤er from costs of lying in
this context. On the other hand, we do not nd more deception with higher
marginal returns on the agents e¤ort for the principal. Instead we observe
exactly the opposite pattern: higher marginal returns on the agentse¤ort
lead to more honest principals. This might again be induced by reference
dependent preferences and loss aversion or the impact of a social norm.
The results of the four experiments presented in this thesis demonstrate
that standard assumptions on the individuals preferences often do not suf-
ce to explain human behavior. However, when setting incentives the right
anticipation of the agents reaction is critical for their success. Hence, the
development of alternative theories integrating more human motives than
just the maximization of ones own absolute utility seems to be important.
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Chapter 2
Piece Rates and Performance1
2.1 Introduction
The question of optimal incentive schemes in principal agent relationships
with hidden action has been the object of research for many years. A well-
established result of most standard hidden action models is that higher in-
centives ceteris paribus lead to higher performance. Field studies and exper-
iments present evidence for this conclusion (e.g. Lazear (2000); Paarsch and
Shearer (1999); Dickinson (1999)).
Still standard results are controversial. Several experimental studies in
economics were recently able to show what psychologists have already been
claiming for some time namely, that the introduction of incentives does not
inevitably stimulate higher e¤ort choices. Moreover, cases exist where intro-
ducing an incentive contract even reduces e¤ort. This phenomenon emerges
in real e¤ort experiments (Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a); Gneezy and Rusti-
chini (2000b); Heyman and Ariely (2004)) as well as in experiments including
abstract e¤ort choices (e.g. Fehr and Gächter (2002); Irlenbusch and Sliwka
(2003)).23
A frequently cited key concept explaining certain anomalies is motivation
1This chapter is based on Pokorny (forthcoming).
2For an overview see Frey and Jegen (2001).
3Examining the willingness of citizens to accept a nuclear waste repository in their
neighborhood, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) nd a similar e¤ect in the eld of politics.
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crowding out (e.g. Frey (1997)). In this framework two types of motivation
are specied, namely intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.4 The core of the the-
ory in this context is that implementing a performance dependent compensa-
tion scheme might strengthen extrinsic incentives while diminishing intrinsic
motivation. As a consequence the e¤ect of introducing a variable compensa-
tion is ambiguous. Recently economists tried to include these considerations
into economic models (e.g. Bénabou and Tirole (2003); Frey (1997)). Bén-
abou and Tirole (2003) interpret incentives o¤ered by the principal as a signal
of task attractiveness or di¢ culty. In their model the principal has perfect
information on the actual attractiveness of the task but the agent only ob-
serves an imperfect signal on it. If the actual attractiveness of the task is low
the principal fears that the agent receives a low signal of task attractiveness
and therefore ensures performance by o¤ering higher extrinsic rewards. That
way Bénabou and Tirole (2003) show that higher rewards may diminish the
agents performance as they represent the principals pessimistic information
on task attractiveness. Frey (1997) introduces a simple principal agent model
including intrinsic motivation where the agents utility increases in wage and
decreases in e¤ort. If the principal implements stronger incentives the im-
pact of the intervention on the agents e¤ort choice is not clear. Frey (1997)
distinguishes three e¤ects caused by the principals intervention namely a
price e¤ect, an enhancing e¤ect and a crowding out e¤ect. The price e¤ect
simply denotes the e¤ect of higher opportunity costs of lower e¤ort levels.
Representing a positive perception of the principals intervention the enhanc-
ing e¤ect amplies the impact of the price e¤ect. In turn the crowding out
e¤ect refers to a negative assessment of the increase in incentives producing
lower e¤ort choices. Still, the net e¤ect is hardly predictable since price and
enhancing e¤ect point in the same direction, while the crowding out e¤ect
a¤ects the opposite. Particularly it seems feasible that for lower interven-
tions the crowding out e¤ect dominates the price e¤ect resulting in reduced
e¤ort whereas higher interventions cause increasing e¤ort choices due to the
4Intrinsic motivation denotes an inner drive to do things (e.g. pleasure) while extrinsic
motivation describes a behavior driven by rewards outside the individual. The idea of
intrinsic motivation was rst introduced by Deci (1971) and DeCharms (1968).
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prevailing inuence of the price e¤ect.
However, the concept of intrinsic motivation is disputed among psychol-
ogists as psychological meta studies present ambiguous results (e.g. Eisen-
berger and Cameron (1996); Deci et al. (1999a); Deci et al. (1999b)).5 Fur-
thermore, in experiments with abstract e¤ort choices motivation crowding
theory fails to provide sensible explanations, as there is no task stimulating
intrinsic motivation.
Another part of the related literature examining the relationship between
incentives and performance indicates the relevance of reference dependent
preferences (e.g. Fehr and Götte (2005); Camerer et al. (1997)). Fehr and
Götte (2005) nd decreasing e¤ort choices with stronger incentives if the
reference income has been exceeded. In that case higher piece rates have a
diminishing impact on work e¤ort.
This chapter investigates the inuence of varying piece rates on work
performance. For this purpose we conducted a real e¤ort experiment at the
Universities of Bonn and Cologne. Real e¤ort conditions were chosen to pre-
vent subjects from restraining on income distribution and more importantly
to generate real disutility from higher e¤ort levels. The design of the experi-
ment has been inspired by a real e¤ort experiment conducted by Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000a) who investigated the inuence of varying piece rates on
e¤ort for an IQ test task. In one condition subjects were paid a participation
fee only while subjects in the other three conditions were paid di¤erent piece
rates for every correct answer in addition to the participation fee. Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000a) nd a V-shaped relationship between e¤ort and in-
tensity of incentives. Their main result is that subjects in the condition
without any incentives outperformed those who were paid a very low piece
rate. Moreover, the results indicate that higher piece rates lead to higher
e¤ort when only conditions with positive piece rates are considered. Accord-
ing to Frey (1997)s motivation crowding theory one might argue that for the
low incentive group the crowding out e¤ect dominated the price e¤ect while
for the higher incentive condition the price e¤ect prevailed. As another ap-
5For a good overview on the literature on intrinsic motivation see Kunz and Pfa¤
(2002).
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proach Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) o¤er an explanation stating that the
xed wage group thought the work on the IQ test to be part of the contract
concluded with the experimenters. Introducing the variable compensation
completed the contract with regard to the meaning of the xed wage as a
show-up fee.
To test the e¤ect of di¤erent strengths of incentives on the subjectsper-
formance we introduced four di¤erent compensation schemes and two tasks.
The rst task we used was an IQ test to check whether the Gneezy and Rus-
tichini (2000a) results were robust for our design. Hence, these conditions
are closely related to theirs. As motivation crowding out might be a reason
for the failure of incentives the second objective of this chapter is to explore
how far characteristics of the tasks inuence the e¤ect of incentives on the
subjectse¤ort. Since the type of task might be important with regard to
the ability of stimulating intrinsic motivation we introduced a counting task
in addition to an IQ test. In the counting task conditions the subjects were
asked to count the frequency of a particular number in blocks of random
numbers which was di¤erent with respect to some features. First it did not
consist of various exercises but only one task and second it required a lot of
concentration. Thus, we are able to compare performance for two tasks with
putative di¤erent ability of stimulating intrinsic motivation.
For the IQ test task we nd two main e¤ects: (1) Very low incentives
induce higher performance than o¤ering no incentives. (2) High piece rates
reduce performance compared to very low incentives. So the data indicate
an inversely U-shaped relationship between e¤ort levels and incentive inten-
sity contrasting Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a). The data of the counting
task merely show the latter e¤ect of lower e¤ort levels with high powered
incentives. In order to explain the experimental results we develop a simple
principal agent model accounting for the agents loss aversion.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 de-
scribes the experimental design and procedures and develops hypotheses on
the results. Furthermore the results are presented and discussed. In Section
2.3 the model including reference dependency is introduced and developed.
The last section concludes.
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2.2 The Real E¤ort Experiment
2.2.1 Experimental Set-up and Procedures
We conducted eight di¤erent conditions with two di¤erent tasks and four dif-
ferent compensation schemes. The rst task was comparable with the Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000a) IQ test (IQ) consisting of 48 exercises extracted from
a book for logical training. No special skills were necessary to answer these
questions. With the other task (CN) participants were required to count
the number of onesand sevensout of 24 blocks of random numbers put
together by a computer program.6 For both tasks the maximum number of
points that could be achieved was 48.
All participants were told that they would always get 5e as a participation
fee. The participants who were assigned to the rst compensation scheme
received the participation fee only (no incentive = NI). The other groups
earned 0:01e (very low incentive = VLI), 0:05e (low incentive = LI), and
0:5e (high incentive = HI) respectively for each point scored in addition to
the show-up fee.7
The subjects who worked on the IQ task received a point for every correct
answer but 0:5 points were subtracted for any incorrect answer.8 In the CN
task an answer was valued correct if it corresponded to the correct number of
onesand sevensrespectively with a deviation of one. If the exact number
of onesin a block was for example 30, subjects who counted 29, 30; or 31
onesreceived one point.
After all individuals had entered the room they were requested to sit
down on seats marked with a pen and paper. After everybody had sat down
the supervisors handed out the exercises. Each of them was covered with
a sheet with the instructions printed on.9 The subjects had 30 minutes to
work on the task. After exactly 30 minutes a bell rang and the supervisors
handed out forms and asked the subjects to ll in their answers. Additionally
6For examples of both tasks see appendix.
71e was about 1$ at the time of the rst sessions of the experiment.
8That was to prevent subjects from guessing which seemed to be necessary as there
were several multiple-choice questions.
9For a translated version of the instructions see appendix.
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a questionnaire was xed to the form. The participants were granted another
5 minutes to copy the answers into the form and complete the questionnaire.
The questionnaire included several questions such as gender, age, years of
study etc. The phase in which the subject answered the questionnaire was
critical for the success of the experiment. Subjects might have continued
working on the tasks rather than answering the questions and therefore attain
higher scores. We discuss this problem again in the results chapter. The
supervisors collected the forms and informed the subjects when and where
they were requested to come to receive their payment. The whole procedure
took about 45 minutes.
We conducted three experimental sessions. The rst one took place in
November 2002 at the University of Bonn. The two other sessions were run
at the University of Cologne in July 2003 and October 2005 respectively.10
In total 267 of the universitiesundergraduate students of various disciplines
participated in the experiment. The remuneration was paid out about one
week after each session.11
2.2.2 Hypotheses
According to standard theoretical predictions, participants of conditions with
higher incentives exhibit higher performance. Those participants who receive
the xed wage are expected to exert the lowest e¤ort level. The monotonically
increasing relation between strength of incentives and e¤ort can be expressed
by
Hypothesis 1:
eNI < eV LI < eLI < eHI
where e denotes the e¤ort level under the respective compensation scheme.
Considering motivation crowding theory things appear di¤erent. Due to the
10In the sessions in November 2002 and July 2003 we conducted the NI, LI and HI
conditions. The VLI session took place in October 2005. For this session we used the
online recruitment software ORSEE developed in Greiner (2003). We thank an anonymous
referee for the suggestion to conduct a condition with a very low piece rate.
11In each session there were a few participants who did not come to collect their payment.
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No Very low Low High
incentive incentive incentive incentive
Mean 16:6 21:8 18:7 16:4
Median 17:5 20:5 19:5 15:5
Stand. dev. 8:2 9:6 9:2 9:8
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics IQ task
multitude of di¤erent e¤ects a precise prediction is di¢ cult to make. Assum-
ing that for small interventions the crowding out e¤ect dominates the price
e¤ect but for high interventions the price e¤ect dominates the crowding out
e¤ect we might observe a non-monotonic relation. That is, participants in
the VLI condition should perform worse than those in the NI condition. Par-
ticipants in the HI condition in turn should yield higher scores than those in
the VLI and LI conditions. As the IQ conditions resemble the Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000a) experiment a similar e¤ect might be expected i.e. sub-
jects in the xed wage condition and in the high incentive condition exert
signicantly more e¤ort than the very low (and low) incentive group.
Hyptothesis 2:
eNI > eV LI < eLI < eHI :
Due to the monotony of the CN task di¤erent observations are likely
because compared to the IQ its potential to stimulate intrinsic motivation
or work pleasure may be lower. Thus, a monotonically increasing relation
between wage and e¤ort according to Hypothesis 1 could be expected with
these conditions.
2.2.3 Results
For the analysis of the results we use higher point scorings to approximate
higher e¤ort choices. First we look at the performance data of subjects who
participated in the IQ test. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table
2.1. The means are illustrated in Figure 2.1 where ninety percent of the scores
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Figure 2.1: Mean scores IQ task
lie within the interval presented along the vertical lines.12 The descriptive
statistics show that subjects in the VLI condition yield the best results. For
both no incentives and high incentives the e¤orts levels are almost equally
low. All in all, Figure 2.1 depicts an inversely U-shaped relation between
strengths of incentives and IQ test scores. In order to check whether the
performance di¤erences are signicant we ran a pairwise comparison using a
two-sided t-test. The results are displayed in Table 2.2.13 Indeed, subjects
who are o¤ered very low incentives perform signicantly better than those in
the NI and the HI conditions. This provides evidence for a positive e¤ect of
very low piece rates on work e¤ort in this context. The di¤erence between
e¤orts under very low incentives and low incentives is not signicant at any
conventional level.
Obviously, the performance increase between the no incentives and very
low incentives groups contrasts the Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) ndings.
Hence, we cannot conrm that a very low piece rate causes lower e¤ort levels
12The entire distribution of the data is reported in Table 2.6 in the appendix.
13We additionally ran all comparisons using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U-test.
The results are shown in Table 2.7 in the appendix.
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No Very low Low High
incentive incentive incentive incentive
No incentive **(**) - -
Very low incentive - **(**)
Low incentive -
**signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%; - not signicant
Results of one-sided test in parentheses
Table 2.2: Results t-test IQ task
No Very low Low High
incentive incentive incentive incentive
Mean 25.5 26.4 25.3 22.4
Median 25 25 26 22
Stand. dev. 10.3 9 8.3 7.3
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics CN task
compared to a xed wage. In addition, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) nd
increasing scores with higher incentives if they have once been introduced.
However, subjects in the HI condition provided signicantly less e¤ort. So
our results do not only contrast standard theoretical predictions but also the
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) results as we observe the opposite behavioral
pattern
eNI < eV LI > eLI > eHI :
Therefore, the IQ task data do neither provide evidence for standard theory
expressed in Hypothesis 1 nor for an undermining e¤ect of incentives of the
form described in Hypothesis 2. Let us now consider the data of the counting
task. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.3 and seem to be
qualitatively similar to the IQ task but less pronounced. Again the subjects
in the VLI condition show the highest mean scores. Figure 2.2 illustrates the
inversely U-shaped relation between level of piece rate and e¤ort exertion for
the CN task. However, running a pairwise comparison between conditions
we only nd signicant di¤erences between the high incentive condition and
the other three conditions (see Table 2.4). Again, we neither nd evidence
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Figure 2.2: Mean scores CN task
for standard theory nor conrmation for the Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a)
ndings. In turn, the important discovery within the CN data seems to be
the decrease in e¤ort with a high rate of variable compensation. Table 2.4
shows a signicantly negative inuence of the high incentive scheme on point
scorings which is line with the e¤ect of high piece rates we observe with the
IQ task.
Still, there are two issues which limit the interpretation of the data. First,
during the phase in which the subjects were granted time to complete the
questionnaire they might have continued working on the task instead of an-
swering all of our questions. If they did so this might distort the results.
The second issue is that individual performance data do not only de-
pend on e¤ort but might be inuenced by several unobserved factors such
as ability to solve the tasks, the subjectsexpectation about the own ability
to solve the task and more importantly risk aversion for which we cannot
control here. However, we have some demographic data we can use to run a
robustness check on the results. Therefore we take the subjectsage (age)
and the number of semesters spent at university (semesters) so far into a
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No Very low Low High
incentive incentive incentive incentive
No incentive - - (*)
Very low incentive - **(**)
Low incentive (*)
**signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%; - not signicant
Results of one-sided test in parentheses
Table 2.4: Results t-test CN task
simple regression. We also include the squares of these variables (age2and
semesters2) to check for the impact of great deviations. In order to control
for the task and the compensation scheme we include dummy variables no
incentivefor subjects in the NI conditions, low incentivefor those in the
LI conditions, high incentivefor the HI conditions and IQ testfor the IQ
test task. Participants in the very low incentive condition serve as a refer-
ence group here. Note that subjects who did not complete the questionnaire
are not included in this estimation (since we do not have their demographic
data). The results of the analysis are presented in Table 2.5. The analysis
demonstrates that none of the control variables has a measurable inuence
on the point scorings. However, even when controlling for age and semesters
spent at university we observe signicant poorer performance of participants
in the no incentives condition. Moreover subjects in the high incentive con-
dition yield signicantly 6:2 points less than those in the very low incentive
condition. Hence, we can consider the outcomes as being robust with regard
to the control variables. Apart from that we nd that even when we extract
the performance data of the subjects from the sample who did not nish
completing the questionnaire this does not alter the outcomes qualitatively.
2.2.4 Discussion
Considering the results described above we obtain two main results. First,
for the IQ task subjects receiving the xed wage only (NI) perform worse
than those being paid a very low (VLI) piece rate in addition. This con-
tradicts the Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) results but seems to be in line
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Number of point scorings
No incentive -3.469**
(1.72)
High incentive -6.196***
(1.71)
Low incentive -2.687
(1.73)
IQ test -5.731***
(1.18)
Age -0.452
(1.09)
Age2 0.00333
(0.020)
Semesters 0.748
(0.58)
Semesters2 -0.0678
(0.041)
Constant 35.35**
(14.3)
Observations 237
R2 0.17
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2.5: Results OLS regression
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with standard theory predicting higher e¤ort with stronger incentives. The
second major nding is the signicant decrease in point scorings with high
powered incentives which occurs for both tasks. A possible interpretation of
this result might be an increasing crowding out e¤ect with increasing strength
of incentives. That is, the stronger the extrinsic incentive the more intrin-
sic motivation is crowded out causing reduced e¤ort choices. However, this
theory cannot explain the poor results of the NI group since this groups per-
formance should be better than the VLI groups. Another explanation might
be a growing error rate with increasing incentives. Intuitively one might
argue that participants feel excited imagining a very high possible income.
Therefore the implementation of a high piece rate might stimulate very high
e¤ort in quantity resulting in worse quality of performance and consequently
more mistakes. In that case a rather high e¤ort in quantity would cause the
worse results of the HI group compared to the VLI group. Surprisingly, the
data do not conrm this conjecture. For both tasks there are no signicant
di¤erences between numbers of errors between these conditions if we use a
two-sided t-test.14 Therefore this explanation cannot be robustly conrmed.
However, for us the most convincing interpretation seems to be a theory
of reference dependent preferences meaning that the subjects had a certain
reference income in mind when participating in the experiment. At the Uni-
versities of Bonn and Cologne experiments are run regularly. It is a common
habit for students to participate and earn extra money. It is well known
that participation in experiments is remunerated with an average of approx-
imately 10e although we did not explicitly mention this.15 Still, we might
roughly guess what the subjects had expected to earn. Note that this was
not the case the session in Cologne in July 2003. By that time no permanent
laboratory had been established yet and hence students were not familiar
with taking part in economic experiments. Therefore subjects had to be
recruited from undergraduate courses by reporting the average wage in the
experiment of about 10e. This value refers to the average of earnings over
14If we apply a one-sided t-test we nd a weakly signicant increase in errors for the IQ
task in HI condition compared to the VLI condition.
15This is an average value. Of course this value varies within the experiments depending
on the role the participant plays. In ordinary jobs students earn about 10 to 15e.
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all conditions. So in that case it was possible to inuence the participants
expectations and generate a reference level articially.
Due to the design of the experiment it was not possible to earn 10e for
the NI group since their payment was 5e independent of their performance.
Participants in the VLI (LI) group could earn a maximum wage of 5:48e
(7:40e) being less than the average of 10e. Still reaching this maximum
income was very unlikely since the average number of points actually reached
was much lower than the maximum.16 So it can be assumed that members
of the VLI and the LI group knew from the start that they would have to
work hard and concentrated to get close to their reference wage. In contrast
to that the HI group could reach the level of 10e by attaining few points
only.17 Consequently the VLI (LI) group had to work a lot harder than the
HI group and maybe did so to get closer to the reference wage.
2.3 An Alternative Theory
2.3.1 Incentives and Reference Dependent Preferences
None of the theories discussed above can explain the surprising outcomes of
the experiment. For that reason a di¤erent type of theory has to be estab-
lished. This section tries to o¤er one possible explanation for the experimen-
tal results with a simple model including reference dependent preferences.
The assumption of a reference level of compensation seems to be straight-
forward, since people might not only use their actual wage level to eval-
uate their utility but take a reference level (e.g. an expected wage or a
rivals/workmates wage) into account.
The relevance of reference points has been the object of research in many
elds. Among the rst, introducing the concept of reference points are Kah-
neman and Tversky (1979) analyzing decisions under uncertainty. They de-
velop a model describing loss aversion by designing a utility function includ-
ing a reference point. This utility function has a convex slope below the
16None of the subjects scored the maximum number of points in any condition.
17In the HI group subjects could earn up to a maximum of 29e.
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reference point. It changes at the reference point and develops a concave
slope. Hence subjects behave risk seeking below the reference point and risk
averse beyond it. Evidence for the relevance of the theory was found early
in many experiments (e.g. MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979)). Investigat-
ing the e¤ect of loss aversion under risk-less choice Tversky and Kahneman
(1991) extent the application of reference dependent utility. Easterlin (2001)
examines the relation between happiness and income. Although he nds a
positive relationship between income and happiness, income growth does not
a¤ect lifetime happiness since according to his theory aspirations grow with
increasing income. Thus, the reference point, from which happiness is eval-
uated, changes. There are some empirical studies explaining their ndings
with loss aversion. Fehr and Götte (2005) nd reduced e¤ort with higher
wages in a eld experiment on the work habits of bicycle messengers. The
messengers worked more days a month but decreased their shifts per work-
ing day that is reduced e¤ort. On the other hand Oettinger (1999) does not
nd comparable e¤ects analyzing data of stadium vendorswork participa-
tion decisions. He points out that participation is signicantly higher if the
expected wage can be assumed to be higher on the respective date of the
game. Still, Oettinger (1999) does not observe any explicit e¤ort levels. In
a study on New York Cab Drivers Camerer et al. (1997) report decreasing
numbers of working hours among Cab Drivers on high wage days. A recent
experimental paper nding lower e¤ort levels with higher variable wages for
several real e¤ort tasks is Ariely et al. (2005).
2.3.2 The Model
In this approach the assumption is made that peoples utility does not only
refer to the absolute height but rather to the relative height of monetary
compensations. Beyond the reference point any further income growths rel-
atively lose value. It follows that compared to the standard case less or no
additional e¤ort is rational after reaching the reference level, as costs would
exceed utility gains from wage. The reference wage is dened as a point
from where wages are evaluated. This might be a wage the agent expects
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or perceives to be appropriate for a certain task. The utility function in-
creases linear in wage but attens as a reference wage is reached. Thus,
utility increases slower if wages exceed the reference point.
Since the model described in this section is supposed to be a theoretical
approach to explain the experimental results we do not calculate the optimal
incentive scheme. We rather take a wage contract comparable to those in
the experiment.
Assume a utility function, which is additive-separable of the form:
U(w; e) = v(w)  c(e);
where w represents wage and e denotes the agents exerted e¤ort. As shown
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Figure 2.3: Returns on wage
in Figure 2.3 the slope of the utility function is discontinuous at value R
v(w) =
(
w if w < R
R + (w  R)s if w  R (2.1)
with 0  s < 1:
The value R represents the reference wage from which the agent evaluates
25
the actual wage.18 Since s is strictly less than 1, marginal utility from w is
smaller above the reference point than below. Assessing the situation from
the reference point R the agent is in a loss situation if the rst inequality is
met because she stays below it. If the second inequality is met she is in a
win situation. As the agent is work-averse, e¤ort exertion is costly. Costs
c(e) are convex in e with c0(e) > 0, c00(e) > 0, c (0) = 0 and lim
e!1
c0(e) = 1.
Furthermore let the wage contract be linear in e with a xed wage  :
w = + e:
The crucial question is for which value of e the agent changes from the left
to the right side of the utility function. That is exactly the e¤ort level where
the agent earns a wage equal to the reference income. Let us call this decisive
value the critical e
eR =
R  

: (2.2)
The optimal choice of e¤ort is determined by the rst order condition of
the agents objective function.19 The rst derivative of the corresponding
objective function yields
U 0(e) =
(
   c0(e) if e < eR
s   c0(e) if e  eR :
This consideration leads to three possible cases.
18Note, that the advantage of this utility function is that it is a very simple way to
include loss aversion and reference dependency. In addition it enables us to precisely
determine the reference point.
19Due to the concavity of the objective function the rst order condition is necessary
and su¢ cient for a maximum.
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Proposition 1 For given values of  and  the agents optimal e¤ort level
e is:
e =
8>>><>>>:
c0 1() if  < c0(R 

)
R  

if 1
s
c0(R 

)    c0(R 

):
c0 1(s) if s > c0(R 

)
(2.3)
Proof: See Appendix.
For low values of  the employees optimal e¤ort choice is located to the
left of the critical value. The e¤ort level is located exactly on the critical
value for an intermediate . The third row presents the employees e¤ort de-
cision for su¢ ciently high values of  where the e¤ort choice is located to the
right of the kink. The change of e in the incentive parameter is presented
in Figure 2.4. Figure 2.4 shows that there is an area where the optimal ef-
fort level chosen by the agent decreases in the incentive parameter. In this
area the agent always chooses e = eR. Since eR decreases in  we nd a
downwards sloping curve in this interval. Consequently, from the principals
point of view increasing piece rates in this area are counterproductive not
only because they are costly but also because they even reduce the agents
performance. However, our model is subject to some limitations which de-
serve mention. The behavioral predictions strongly depend on the reference
wage. Obviously a reference wage is an individuals private information and
hence not directly measurable. Furthermore, the reference income might
vary between individuals or groups of individuals or over time. Assuming
di¤erent reference wages for di¤erent agents seems to be more realistic but
exacerbates predictions. The model also lacks any insights into the origin
and dynamics of reference points although this might be a critical issue to
make more general predictions.
Note that the model would lead us to predict a performance increase
between the NI and the VLI groups. As we merely nd a signicant increase
for the IQ task, our data do not completely conrm the predictions of the
model.20
20Another issue is that in our experiment the subjects exerted positive e¤ort even if paid
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Figure 2.4: Optimal e¤ort level
Naturally the choice of parameters drives the model. Therefore parame-
ters ; R; s and the shape of the cost function determine whether the model
generates the experimental results. Moreover, the conditions, under which
this model can explain the phenomenon that occurred in the experiment, are
very specic, assuming rather precise wage expectations. Still it might be a
rst attempt to explain the special situation in which some experiments take
place.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the relation between incentives and e¤ort choices has been
investigated. Our results indicate two main e¤ects: With the IQ test task
subjects who were exposed to very low incentives exerted more e¤ort than
those who only earned a xed wage. This is in contrast with Gneezy and
independent of their performance (NI group). In our model this can only be rational if we
generalize the cost function, so that costs c0(e) are convex in e with c00(e) > 0, c(0) = 0
and lim
e!1 c
0(e) =1 with minimum costs for a strictly positive e¤ort level.
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Rustichini (2000a) observing the opposite behavioral pattern. Secondly, with
both tasks the experimental results demonstrate that e¤ort does not neces-
sarily increase with increasing incentives. Instead the opposite was the case in
the experiment, as higher incentives led to lower performance. Since standard
theory and motivation crowding theory fail to give a convincing explanation
for these results a model including reference dependent utility is applied.
It remains an open question why the outcome was not similar to Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000a), not even with the IQ task. Crowding out seems to be
a very sensitive nding which is inherently obvious following the psychological
literature on crowding out e¤ects (see e.g. Eisenberger and Cameron (1996);
Deci et al. (1999a); Deci et al. (1999b)). It would be interesting to learn under
which conditions these e¤ects are likely to appear since they might dependent
on several factors such as task, composition of wages and most importantly
the subjectsindividual perception of the situation. Those factors might have
an essential inuence on the impact of incentives and should be subject to
further research.
Another interesting observation is that the inuence of specic task fea-
tures seems to be (at least for our tasks) negligible since the outcome is
qualitatively similar. A reason for that could possibly be that the di¤erences
between the tasks were too small to produce a measurable e¤ect. The hy-
pothesis of the IQ task generating more intrinsic motivation than the CN
task cannot be conrmed. Neither the IQ task nor the CN task created
a result, which can be interpreted as crowding out of intrinsic motivation.
Nevertheless it is not understood that di¤erent tasks trigger o¤ the same
behavior. Still, the inuence of task features cannot be resolved with these
experiments.
The vital conclusion of the experiment described in this chapter is not
that incentives do not work. Moreover, the implication should be that incen-
tives might work if the agents income is below her reference point. Beyond
this point however incentives may fail to provide higher performance. Still,
further evidence is necessary to conrm the hypothesis that participants,
who were exposed to a higher variable pay, were quickly pleased with their
wage. For this purpose it would be interesting to check whether subjects
29
reduce their e¤ort once they reached a certain wage level i.e. the reference
wage. Unfortunately we did not observe any temporal variation in the data
since we explicitly allowed subjects to switch the order of the exercises. That
makes it impossible to draw any corresponding conclusions. Another option
of gathering evidence for the relevance of reference points might be question-
ing the subjects directly (in advance to and/or after the session) what their
expectations regarding the wage are. These possibilities should be considered
for future research.
It remains the problematical question what practical implications can ac-
tually be derived from the experiment, since it only admits suppositions on
the participantsmotives. Yet, the individual wage expectations seem to be
important information required to provide optimal incentives. For this pur-
pose, further examinations of the emergence, development and measurement
of reference points are necessary.
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2.5 Appendix to Chapter 2
This is the rst page of the CN task translated from German
Please count the number of ones and sevens
Block 1
0 1 8 5 8 7 0 4 2 4 5 7 0 8 2 4 8 5 7 4 5 8 2 1 6 2 7 6 4 4
3 8 5 2 3 9 7 9 9 3 5 5 6 0 7 1 7 5 3 0 9 6 0 6 3 3 8 5 7 9
6 4 7 6 3 2 2 4 5 8 7 7 5 1 4 2 8 7 6 6 5 3 4 9 8 3 3 0 9 8
2 8 2 6 0 4 7 6 2 0 0 2 5 3 4 5 5 4 7 4 1 1 6 0 2 5 4 3 0 0
4 4 3 1 1 9 2 5 2 4 3 5 4 3 9 8 4 0 2 7 0 8 7 0 5 3 4 3 1 1
3 4 9 8 2 6 3 3 8 2 0 9 3 4 0 0 4 5 5 5 8 9 5 5 0 1 6 4 8 6
2 6 9 0 5 8 8 5 2 1 9 5 0 1 5 3 1 7 0 3 2 4 9 6 2 4 9 7 8 3
8 6 0 5 5 2 9 9 2 3 6 6 8 1 6 3 2 3 5 6 1 4 9 3 4 4 2 1 5 1
9 4 9 3 4 3 3 2 3 0 8 5 7 5 3 7 7 4 0 3 8 3 8 3 7 2 7 7 4 3
8 0 7 2 9 2 2 2 5 4 3 8 5 7 6 6 5 8 7 7 0 0 1 8 3 7 2 0 0 4
9 8 8 6 3 9 7 5 1 5 2 2 6 8 4 8 7 6 3 9 4 9 6 0 3 7 2 6 1 5
0 8 5 2 9 1 1 9 6 7 6 6 3 8 4 3 9 7 2 3 9 8 5 3 9 8 3 2 1 9
Number of ones: 24
Number of sevens: 34
Block 2
8 5 2 6 4 0 5 4 7 9 2 8 6 3 7 2 0 6 5 3 7 2 9 1 1 1 7 8 4 7
6 3 9 8 0 7 8 0 5 7 9 8 1 6 2 1 3 5 9 2 6 5 6 2 7 3 1 9 3 4
0 6 9 4 3 5 6 6 3 8 4 1 2 1 0 3 4 6 9 7 3 9 1 6 7 6 2 1 9 9
1 5 3 3 3 4 0 7 3 3 6 6 0 8 6 9 0 6 6 9 2 0 1 4 6 5 2 4 7 1
5 5 2 7 4 7 9 3 6 5 0 6 8 5 3 9 4 9 8 2 7 1 6 5 9 1 1 4 8 0
0 4 6 7 9 8 5 8 6 5 4 0 4 9 9 7 8 8 9 5 1 9 1 4 8 6 7 8 0 8
0 1 1 5 2 1 0 6 4 9 5 3 0 2 1 1 6 3 2 7 3 6 7 1 8 6 8 2 7 8
1 7 5 6 9 3 6 3 3 5 0 5 4 4 1 8 2 9 0 7 2 2 6 8 4 4 3 9 6 5
0 9 5 2 6 7 0 2 0 3 7 6 9 6 4 4 5 9 0 3 1 5 3 1 9 4 9 7 5 2
7 4 3 5 3 7 5 8 4 1 6 9 5 0 0 0 8 6 6 0 3 9 2 0 3 6 2 2 2 3
8 7 2 3 1 1 0 7 6 2 9 3 4 3 5 4 8 4 0 4 3 9 8 7 0 5 8 6 1 8
9 4 1 5 2 1 8 6 7 5 9 0 0 3 9 4 1 7 6 1 3 5 8 9 5 6 1 9 8 2
Number of ones: 37
Number of sevens: 33
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This is the rst page of the IQ task
32
Instructions CN task (high incentive condition)
Welcome to this experiment! Please do not talk to other participants at
any time during the experiment! Your task is to count the correct number
of ones and sevens in a block of random numbers. You can solve the blocks
in any order you like. For every correct answer you are scored one point. An
answer is valued correct if it states the exact number of ones or sevens with
a deviation of one.
Example:
If the exact number of ones in a block is 30 the answers 29, 30 or 31 are
valued correct.
You have 30 minutes to work on the task. After that we will hand out
forms. Please copy your answers into the form. A questionnaire is xed
to the forms. Please also answer the questionnaire. You will always get a
xed participation fee of 5e and additional 0.5e for every point scored. The
compensation is paid cash on November 26th to 28th from 10.00 to 12.00
oclock at the Chairs library (Room 69). You will be informed about your
scorings as well. Please bring along your anonymous ID-Code. The ID-Code
is printed on your form. Additionally it is xed to your form on a separate
piece of paper. Please tear it o¤ the form and bring it along when you collect
your payment. If you have further questions concerning the procedures raise
your hand and wait until a supervisor comes over to you. Do not ask any
question aloud! Thank You for Your participation!
Instructions IQ task (high incentive condition)
Welcome to this experiment! Please do not talk to other participants at
any time during the experiment! Your task is to solve the following exercises
correctly. Each type of exercise is illustrated by an example. You can solve
the exercises in any order you like. For every correct answer you are scored
one point. For an incorrect answer you get a penalty of 0.5 points. Hence, 0.5
points will be subtracted from your score for an incorrect answer. You have
30 minutes to work on the task. After that we will hand out forms. Please
copy your answers into the form. A questionnaire is xed to the form. Please
also answer the questionnaire. You will always get a xed participation fee
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of 5e and additional 0.5e for every point scored. The compensation is paid
cash on November 26th to 28th from 10.00 to 12.00 oclock at the Chairs
library (Room 69). You will be informed about your scorings as well. Please
bring along your anonymous ID-Code. The ID-Code is printed on your form.
Additionally it is xed to your form on a separate piece of paper. Please tear
it o¤ the form and bring it along when you collect your payment. If you have
further questions concerning the procedures raise your hand and wait until
a supervisor comes over to you. Do not ask any question aloud! Thank You
for Your participation!
Proof. Proposition 1: Due to the strict concavity of the objective function
and the assumption on the cost function there must be a unique internal
optimum. Suppose that e < eR, then
e = c0 1 ()
must hold. That is, the agent chooses an e¤ort level to the left of the kink.
This occurs if
 < c0

R  


:
The equation denes a unique cut-o¤ value for  such that e = c0 1 () i¤ 
is smaller than the cut-o¤ value. In case of e > eR, the optimum is dened
by
e = c0 1 (s) :
Consequently e must be located right of R which happens if
 >
1
s
c0

R  


:
This cut-o¤ value is strictly larger than the cut-o¤ value dened by e =
c0 1 (). It follows that in all other cases the agent chooses e = eR.
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CN task IQ task
NI VLI LI HI NI VLI LI HI
6 0 10 4 -1 5 3 -2
11 14 12 12 0.5 9 3 0
12 16 13 14 3.5 9.5 3.5 1
13 17 14 14 6 11.5 4.5 5.5
15 19 16 14 6.5 12 5 5.5
15 20 16 14 7.5 13 8 6
17 21 16 15 9 14 11.5 6.5
18 21 19 16 10 15 11.5 8
18 23 19 17 12.5 15 12.5 8.5
18 23 20 18 12.5 15 12.5 10
20 24 20 18 13 15.5 14.5 10
20 24 22 19 13.5 17 15.5 10.5
21 24 23 20 14.5 19.5 16.5 11.5
22 25 23 20 16 19.5 17.5 12
23 25 24 20 16 20.5 18 12.5
24 25 25 21 16.5 21.5 19 12.5
25 28 26 21 17.5 23 19.5 12.5
25 28 26 22 18 23 21 14.5
25 29 26 22 18 23.5 21 15
26 31 27 23 19.5 27.5 22 15.5
27 31 27 23 20 29 22 17
27 32 28 23 20.5 29.5 22.5 17.5
30 36 28 25 22 30 24 17.5
31 36 28 25 22.5 31 24 18
34 37 29 25 23.5 32.5 24.5 18.5
35 38 31 26 23.5 35 24.5 21
37 38 31 27 24 36 26.5 21.5
38 40 33 27 25.5 38 28.5 21.5
39 40 35 28 26 41 31 22
40 35 28 26 31.5 22
42 36 28 26.5 32 22.5
43 38 29 26.5 32.5 23
46 40 29 33 35 25.5
43 31 27
34 28.5
35 30
41 33
34.5
42
33 29 34 37 # Obs. 33 29 33 39
Table 2.6: Point scorings by wage and task
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No Very low Low High
incentive incentive incentive incentive
No incentive *(**) - -
Very low incentive - - **(**)
Low incentive - - -
High incentive - **(**) (*)
Results above (below) diagonal refer to IQ task (CN task)
** signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%; - not signicant
Results of one-sided test in parentheses
Table 2.7: Results Mann-Whitney-U-test both tasks
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Chapter 3
The Role of the Fixed Wage in
Setting Incentives1
3.1 Introduction
As we have discussed comprehensively in the previous chapter, most simple
principal agent models predict that stronger incentives ceteris paribus lead
to higher performance of the agent. On the other hand, it is noticeable that
only a relatively small part of the total compensation is performance depen-
dent in many rms. For example, Murphy (1999) using Towers Perrins 1997
Worldwide Total Remuneration report shows that although the composition
of executive pay varies considerably between industries, rm sizes, and coun-
tries, predominantly the greater fraction of the total compensation is covered
by the base salary which constitutes a xed compensation. This seems to be
especially true for CEO payments outside the US. Due to this observation
some questions arise: Does the xed wage play an additional role in incentive
schemes apart from attracting employees and ensuring the acceptance of the
contract? Is there a linkage between the height of xed payments and the
strength of incentives within an incentive contract?
In contrast to Murphy (1999) indicating that variable payment plays a
minor role in CEO compensation, economic theory teaches us the relevance
1This chapter is based on Mohnen and Pokorny (2006a).
37
of variable, performance-based payments. Particularly according to most
simple standard agency models only the variable wage component induces
incentives. A higher piece rate is followed by an increase in the e¤ort level
whereas the xed wage only ensures the agents participation (for seminal
papers on the standard approach see, e.g. Holmström (1979), Grossman and
Hart (1983) or Hart and Holmström (1987)).
The impact of exclusively paying a xed wage on the e¤ort decision has
been examined empirically. An important approach of designing an employer-
employee relationship in the lab is the gift-exchange game (e.g. Berg et al.
(1995), Fehr et al. (1993)). Typically an employer o¤ers a xed wage to
an employee and asks for a certain e¤ort level in exchange. The desired
e¤ort level is not binding but e¤ort exertion is costly for the employee. Ac-
cording to standard game theoretical predictions the employee should exert
the lowest e¤ort level possible and therefore the employer should o¤er the
lowest wage possible at the beginning of the game. However, this is not
what is observed in most experimental studies (Gächter and Falk (2002)
for an overview). Generally, higher wages are paid and higher e¤ort levels
are exerted than predicted by theory. Furthermore, e¤ort exertion signi-
cantly increases in the wage o¤ered. These results are commonly explained
by concepts of social preferences like reciprocity (Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2000)) and inequity aversion or fairness (Akerlof (1982),
Falk and Fischbacher (1999), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000)). According to reciprocity, individualsreactions to friendly behavior
are friendly as well, and vice versa. Consequently, reciprocity theories pre-
dict increasing e¤ort levels with higher wages if a high wage is perceived as
friendliness.
In the previous chapter and the related literature (e.g. Camerer et al.
(1997) and Fehr and Götte (2005)) we have seen that reference dependent
preferences have an impact on the e¤ort decision. If this is the case, the
height of the xed wage has an inuence on the incentive power of the piece
rate. So the aim of this chapter is the investigation of the role of the xed
payment within an incentive contract. To the best of our knowledge, the
e¤ect of varying xed wages on performance has only been examined for
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situations in which the xed wage is paid exclusively. Therefore we test
whether there is an impact of the xed payment on the chosen e¤ort level.
In our approach we rst extend the analysis of reference dependent pref-
erences and loss aversion concerning linear wage contracts. In particular we
try to shed light on the question in how far the xed wage component drives
the e¤ort decision if individuals are loss averse. For this purpose, we de-
rive theoretical predictions on the e¤ect of varying xed wages on the e¤ort
decision from the model developed in Chapter 2. Secondly, we test the re-
sulting predictions in a real e¤ort experiment at the Universities of Bonn and
Cologne. The subjects were all paid the same piece rate but the amount of
the xed payment in the three conditions is varied: low, intermediate and
high. All of them were o¤ered to work on the same calculation task and each
participant in the experiment knew ex ante the precise duration of the work-
ing time and his wage contract. Note that there are no explicit principals in
this experiment who benet from the agentse¤ort. We do this to measure
the impact of wages in a cleanway. Including interaction with principals
might produce di¤erent motives and hence decisions.
We chose real e¤ort conditions to create an environment which is closer
to real work conditions. Laboratory experiments are almost always very
abstract and this is likely to a¤ect the results (Gneezy (2004): 4-5, 7-8). Since
we have real e¤ort costs instead of a monetary cost function in our setting
we believe our results produce better implications for real work environments
than in case of an abstract e¤ort choice.
Our experimental results indicate that workers indeed care about the
xed payments. Subjects receiving the low and high xed payments worked
signicantly more than those participants who were paid an intermediate
xed wage. As the principal agent model including loss aversion can explain
only part of the observed behavioral pattern, we provide a di¤erent explana-
tion for the results which focuses on a kind of social norm representing the
appropriateness of the xed wage payment.2
2Since there are no principals in the experimental setting, reciprocity does not seem
to be a good explanation. However, we nd a kind of reciprocity towards the height of
the xed wage which we call appropriateness.
39
The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section
the principal agent model with loss averse agents is analyzed with regard
to the impact of the xed wage. Section 3.3 describes the details of the
experimental set-up and in Section 3.4 behavioral predictions are developed.
The results are reported in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses interpretations
and explanations of our data. The last section concludes the chapter.
3.2 The Model
As already discussed in Chapter 2, a key notion of reference dependency and
loss aversion in the context of work relationships is the evaluation of wages in
relation to a reference point. That is, not only the absolute amount of wage
determines the resulting utility but rather the relative amount compared to
the reference wage. This reference wage might for instance be a wage which
the agent considers to be appropriate for her work, an expected pay, a rivals
or work mates wage or the past periodswage. Since wage levels below
the reference wage are perceived as losses, marginal returns below it are
higher than above it. It follows that compared to standard theory less or no
additional e¤ort is rational after reaching the reference point. Consequently,
piece rates have a weaker impact on the e¤ort level if the xed wage is above
the reference wage than if it is below it.
As we focus on the xed payment, we now extend the simple model of
reference dependency and loss aversion from the previous chapter to examine
the inuence of the xed wage component on the agents e¤ort decision.
Again reference dependency is introduced by a utility function with a kink
at the reference point.
We use similar assumptions to those in Chapter 2: the utility function U
is additive separable in utility from wage v(w) and the disutility from e¤ort
exertion c(e):
U(w; e) = v(w)  c(e);
where w denotes wage and e represents the e¤ort the agent exerts. The agent
evaluates her actual wage by comparing it to the reference wage R.
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v(w) = r
(
rw if w < R
R + (w  R)s if w  R
with 0  s < r . The utility function v(w) which is discontinuous at reference
value R. Since s is strictly smaller than r, marginal returns on e¤ort are less
above the reference point than below.
As the agent is work-averse, e¤ort exertion is costly. The cost function
c(e) is again assumed to be convex in e with c0(e) > 0; c00(e) > 0; c0(0) = 0
and lim
e!1
c0(e) =1.
Furthermore, let the wage contract be linear in e with a xed wage  and
a piece rate :
w = + e
We have seen in the previous chapter that the critical e is accurately the point
where the change from higher marginal returns to lower marginal returns
takes place. This is exactly the case if the wage w = + e equals R, so we
get equation (2.2). Obviously, the critical eR decreases in the xed wage.
Due to the strict concavity of the objective function the rst order con-
dition is necessary and su¢ cient for a maximum. The rst derivative of the
corresponding objective function yields
U(e) =
(
r   c0(e) if e < eR
s   c0(e) if e  eR :
Analyzing the model with regard to the xed wage component we obtain the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 For given values of  and  the agents optimal e¤ort level
e is:
e =
8><>:
c0 1(r) if  < R  c0 1(r)
R 

if R  c0 1(s)    R  c0 1(r)
c0 1(s) if  > R  c0 1(s)
(3.1)
Proof: See Appendix.
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Proposition 2 shows that if the xed wage  is su¢ ciently small the agents
optimal e¤ort level yields a wage in the left part of the utility function. The
third row of the proposition determines the employees optimal e¤ort choice
if it is located to the right of the critical value eR. These cases occur if 
is su¢ ciently extreme. In between these areas the optimal e¤ort decision
always equals the critical value, thus e = eR. Then the optimal e¤ort level
results in a wage which is located exactly on the kink. The change of e in the
xed wage is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 illustrates that for extreme
8.058.02587.9757.95
0.15
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0.1
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fixed wage
optimal effort level
Figure 3.1: Optimal e¤ort choice for a given xed wage
values of the xed wage, the agent chooses a constant e¤ort level: for low xed
wages he works on a high level and for a su¢ ciently high xed payment on
a low level. This result exactly corresponds to the di¤erent marginal returns
for the agent below and above the reference point. Furthermore, we see that
there is an area where the optimal e¤ort level chosen by the agent decreases
in the xed wage. In this area the agent always chooses eR. Intuitively, if
the xed wage within the incentive contract is higher, the reference wage is
already reached for lower e¤ort levels. This makes the agent reduce his e¤ort
since he does not want to exceed the reference wage due to the lower marginal
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returns above it.4 Hence, in line with Proposition 2 Figure 3.1 shows that
the low e¤ort level is even chosen for values of  < R as the total wage is
the sum of the xed component and the variable component.
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We invited 181 undergraduate students from various faculties at the Uni-
versities of Bonn and Cologne, Germany to participate in the experiment.
We conducted two sessions in July 2004. Altogether we introduced three
di¤erent conditions. Participants of all conditions were seated in one single
room to prevent room e¤ects. After all individuals had entered the room
subjects were randomly assigned to the conditions and requested to sit down
on seats marked with pens and pieces of paper. After everybody had sat
down the supervisors handed out the exercises. Each of them was covered
with a sheet with the instructions printed on. Neither the instructions nor
the compensation scheme were ever read out aloud. In all conditions the
subjects were asked to perform the same task, which was solving relatively
simple but tedious calculation exercises.5 For all conditions we compensated
the subjects with the same piece rate of 0.15e. That is, for each correct
calculation the subjects were paid 0.15e. Additionally, the subjects received
a xed wage which was completely independent of the number of correct cal-
culations. The height of the xed wage component was 2e (low wage), 6e
(intermediary wage) or 12e (high wage) respectively.6 To ensure that the
participants did not solve the calculation exercise just to avoid boredom, they
were additionally o¤ered crossword puzzles and similar entertaining quizzes.
We emphasized in the instructions that they would receive no variable wage
for solving the quizzes. Participants in all three conditions were granted forty
minutes to work on the task. After forty minutes a bell rang and the super-
visors collected the exercise sheets. Moreover, questionnaires were handed
4Note that the agent will always exert positive e¤ort for any positive incentive para-
meter .
5For an example of the instructions and the task see appendix.
61e was roughly 1.2$ at the time of the experiment.
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out to each subject to collect some demographic data. Then participants
were informed when and where they were asked to come and receive their
payment.7
3.4 Hypotheses
In addition to our model of reference dependency and loss aversion, we con-
sult standard agency models and reciprocity to derive hypotheses.
According to simple principal agent models the height of the xed com-
ponent does not inuence the e¤ort decision of the agent because only the
variable component is relevant:8
Hypothesis 1:
eL = eI = eH ;
where e denotes the average e¤ort in the respective condition.
If reciprocity is the motive for the action to take, we should expect in-
creasing e¤ort levels with higher wages if higher wages are perceived as a
friendly action.
Hypothesis 2:
eL  eI  eH
if participants act reciprocally in our experiment.
Of course reciprocity is typically closely associated to a counterpart. As
there are no principals in our experiment the conventional idea of reciprocity
is harder to apply here. But still the subjects might perceive the experimenter
as a kind of counterpart they interact with. Although there are no obvious
advantages of higher scorings for the experimenter, the participants might
su¤er from a bad conscience if they receive a high xed wage but do not exert
corresponding e¤orts. As argued in Bewley (1999) a certain amount of money
7The remuneration was paid o¤ about one week after the session had taken place.
8It is straightforward that higher e¤ort levels can be approximated by an increasing
number of correct answers.
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Fixed wage Mean Median Stand. dev. Max Min
Low 21.068 21 9.958 47 1
Intermediary 18.094 17 7.904 47 0
High 20.207 20 9.354 42 0
Table 3.1: Descriptives statistics
goes along with a certain e¤ort level, i.e. employees have an appropriate e¤ort
level in mind tting to the height of their remuneration.
With regard to loss aversion and reference dependent utility the e¤ect
of varying the xed wage depends on the individuals reference point. As
shown in Figure 3.1, in our model reference dependent preferences and loss
aversion lead to a weakly decreasing slope of e¤ort in the xed wage which
is the exact opposite to the predictions derived from reciprocity theory.
Hypothesis 3:
eL  eI  eH :
If the xed wage is su¢ ciently small so that the agent chooses e according
to c0 1(r) we should observe relatively high scores. In all other cases the
optimal e¤ort level is lower than c0 1(r). Hence, there might be a decreasing
relation between scores and the xed wage component in our experimental
results if in one or two of the higher paid conditions the absolute wage exceeds
the reference point.
3.5 Results
To approximate the e¤ort the subjects exerted on the task we analyze the
number of correct answers in the di¤erent conditions. Some descriptive re-
sults are presented in Table 3.1. Figure 3.2 illustrates the median number
of correct answers for low wage, intermediary wage and high wage. As can
be seen in Figure 3.2 the relation between exerted e¤orts and xed wage
components is non-monotonic in our data. For a low level of xed wage the
number of correct answers is higher than for an intermediary level. With a
relatively high xed wage the number of correct answers increases again. We
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Figure 3.2: Median scores over conditions
ran a pairwise comparison with a one-sided t-test. The di¤erence between
the low and the intermediary wage conditions are signicant on a 5% level
(p = 0:0340). Comparing the intermediary and the high wage groups the
di¤erence is weakly signicant (p = 0:0895).2
As the individual results of the real e¤ort task probably do not only
depend on the strength of exerted e¤ort but also on several unobserved factors
we also used parametric estimation methods to analyze our data. It is likely
that other individual characteristics like e.g. calculation ability or session
specic aspects like room conditions (noise, temperature) might have had
an inuence on the individual performance which makes the data relatively
noisy, especially compared to standard lab experiments with abstract e¤ort
choice. However, the allocation of abilities in the three conditions should be
normally distributed due to the large condition sizes. But for session e¤ects
2Using a Mann-Whitney-U-test the di¤erence in correct answers between the low wage
and the intermediary wage groups is weakly signicant (p = 0:09 two-tailed). The di¤er-
ence between the intermediary wage condition and the high wage condition is not signi-
cant (p = 0:14, two-tailed).
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we control in the following regression analysis.9
We examine the results with median regression since there is a consider-
ably large number of outliers in the data.10 Median regression minimizes the
sum of absolute deviations rather than squared deviations. Due to its lower
sensitivity towards outliers we consider the median regression to be a better
measure for the central tendency of the data here.11 The results of the re-
gressions are presented in Table 3.2. We include two wage dummies: one for
the highly paid group (high xed wage) and another for the low paid group
(low xed wage). In addition we control for the subjectsincome, age and the
place where the session took place (cologneis a dummy variable with value
one if the subjects participated in the session at the University of Cologne
and zero otherwise). The subjects receiving an intermediary wage served as
a reference group in the regression to which the two other conditions are
compared.
The coe¢ cients of both wage dummies have a positive sign and are signif-
icantly di¤erent from zero. Model (1) shows that subjects in the high xed
wage condition yield signicantly 3 correct answers more than individuals
paid an intermediary xed wage. This result is conrmed by models (2)
and (3). Moreover, subjects in the low wage condition even achieve 4 cor-
rect calculations more than those in the intermediary condition in model (1).
Models (2) and (3) again demonstrate a similar pattern. Hence, it follows
that, deviations from the intermediary wage in both directions lead to higher
performance.12
As the results might be driven by the individual income level we asked
the subjects about the monetary amount they monthly had at their disposal
(we o¤ered three categories). The applied parametric analysis allows us to
9An important di¤erence between the sessions at the University of Bonn and the Uni-
versity of Cologne is that this experiment was one of the rst at the University of Cologne.
At the University of Bonn economic experiments are conduced regularly and are well-
known among students. Note that since there was only one session at each of the two
universities this variable covers the time and the subject pool of the session as well.
10For the application of median regression, see Greene (2003).
11We also ran an OLS regression on the data which can be found in the appendix in
Table 3.3.
12Note that for an OLS regression the coe¢ cient of the high xed wage dummy variable
is not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
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(1) (2) (3)
Number of point scorings
High xed wage 3.00** 3.00* 3.39**
(1.4) (1.6) (1.7)
Low xed wage 4.00*** 5.00*** 4.21**
(1.4) (1.5) (1.7)
Cologne 0 0 -1.21
(1.1) (1.3) (1.4)
Income 2 1.00 0.91
(1.4) (1.5)
Income 3 1.00 0.82
(2.1) (2.4)
Income 4 4.00 0.70
(4.4) (5.1)
Age 0.30
(0.2)
Constant 17*** 16*** 9.42*
(1.1) (1.5) (5.3)
Observations 181 181 181
Pseudo R2 .0245 .0325. .0435.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 3.2: Results median regression
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control for these external factors. But the results show that income does not
have a signicant e¤ect on the e¤ort decision.
A second interesting question is whether di¤erent levels of the xed wage
component inuence the quality of task performance or approach of solving
the task. Realizing that a wage is very high, participants might feel motivated
to work harder and faster. A consequence might be higher error rates. To
analyze this we examine the number of given answers and the corresponding
error rates. Still, we do not nd signicant di¤erences in error rates for the
di¤erent conditions in models (1) and (2). The average rates of mistakes are
presented in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 shows that the error rate hardly changes
Figure 3.3: Median error rates over conditions
over conditions. Thus, we conclude that the better results of the low wage
group were not triggered by a higher work quality but simply by higher work
quantity.
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3.6 Interpretation
As mentioned above, we nd signicant di¤erences between conditions and
hence we cannot conrm standard theoretical results (Hypothesis 1).
Furthermore reciprocity alone cannot explain the observations since we
should nd a monotonically increasing slope of e¤ort in the xed wage (Hy-
pothesis 2). Still, the increase from the intermediary to the high xed wage
might be triggered by some sort of reciprocal considerations. As our exper-
imental design does not include principals, reciprocity in the common sense
is not very plausible. However, there might be some related motive behind
the observed behavior which is not directly linked to a counterpart but to
the wage received. Some kind of bad conscienceof exerting low e¤ort al-
though being paid a very generous xed wage (12e) might have triggered
the subjectse¤ort. A low e¤ort level could be recognized as inappropriate
if a very generous xed amount is paid, although there is a piece rate. The
xed wage of 12e is apparently very high because the average payment in
such an experiment is well known to be 10e per hour.
Loss aversion and reference dependent preferences (Hypothesis 3) can also
explain only part of the experimental results since the theory might in fact
predict lower e¤ort choices for higher wages (compare low and intermediary
wage) but would never predict a re-increase for high wages. Moreover, after
a decrease, the e¤ort choices should remain on the same level or diminish
even more.14
Each of the three approaches falls short of providing clarication on its
own. Combining loss aversion and the above mentioned explanation of ap-
propriateness of wage and e¤ort we might nd another possible explanation.
Bewley (1999) provides evidence that employees do not behave strategically
14Another straightforward interpretation is of course the occurrence of an income e¤ect.
According to the Slutsky equation a higher xed payment leads to less e¤ort if leisure is
a normal good, which can be assumed here. Still, we do not believe in an income e¤ect
because the subjectslife income is not likely to be severely inuenced by the participation
in an experiment. This argument is also supported by the examination of the income
variables which are insignicant in any specication of the estimation models. That is,
the level of income does not signicantly inuence the number of correct answers in the
experiment.
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but feel impelled by morale. He stresses the idea that their e¤orts are mainly
driven by the adequacy of their actual wages.15 As there is no clearly de-
manded e¤ort level in our experiment, the agent might derive a desired e¤ort
level from the height of the xed wage he is o¤ered. Consequently, we argue
that the appropriateness of the height of the xed payment and the e¤ort
level makes the agent increase performance with rising xed wages.16 Then,
appropriateness of wage and e¤ort is a kind of a social norm. This would
mean that the employee transfers the xed wage via the social norm into an
appropriate level of e¤ort.17
If the employee is loss averse in addition, the following interaction is
possible: Given a very low wage, the social norm of appropriateness would
merely require a low e¤ort level. But the employee su¤ers from loss aversion if
the reference point is not yet reached. So for very low wages the e¤ort would
be relatively high in order to get closer to the desired reference wage. Yet, in
the region of the reference point e¤ort decreases because the marginal returns
are lower after exceeding the reference point. Consequently, for intermediate
xed wages loss aversion might overpower the norm of appropriateness which
leads to lower e¤orts. In turn for su¢ ciently high xed wages the norm of
appropriateness may dominate loss aversion and as a consequence the e¤ort
choices increase. This might be a possible explanation for our experimental
results but we are aware that the relevance of this approach should be tested
in future research.
15Bewley (1999) conducts interviews with employees, employers, trade unionists and
civil servants.
16As the xed wage is the unconditional part of the compensation the agent might
interpret the level of the xed wage as a measure of trust towards him. In turn the
variable payment could be considered as an instrument of control by the agent. Therefore
only the height of the xed wage should be relevant for the agents considerations of
appropriateness.
17We could capture this consideration in a model using a utility function similar to Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). Though here it would not be inequity aversion towards a counterpart
but it would be a kind of fairness/appropriateness regarding the level of the xed wage.
51
3.7 Conclusion
Our experimental results indicate that workers indeed care about the xed
wages. The group with the low xed payment as well as the group with
the high xed wage worked signicantly more than those participants who
received an intermediate xed wage. Consequently, we nd a U-shaped slope
of e¤ort in the xed wage. However, at rst sight it is quite surprising that
an intermediate xed wage level leads to less e¤ort than a low or high one.
Our empirical ndings cannot be explained by any of the three theories
we considered beforehand, namely standard agency models, reciprocity, and
reference dependent preferences. Although these three theories would lead
us to predict di¤erent relationships between the level of the xed wage and
the chosen e¤ort level, none of them alone is able to explain the experimental
results.
The experiment shows that the xed wage does have a signicant inu-
ence on the individuals e¤ort decision. Linear incentive schemes seem to be
e¤ective if the xed wage is relatively low or high. In case of a low xed
payment it appears as if the e¤orts are driven by reference dependent pref-
erences. If a su¢ ciently high xed wage is paid the e¤ort level increases in
comparison to an intermediate xed wage. Possibly a social norm of appro-
priateness is important in this context demanding a certain level of e¤ort to
coincide with a certain xed wage, where not fullling the norm leads to disu-
tility. The combination of two di¤erent explanatory approaches seems to be
arbitrary at rst glance. But typically gift exchange experiments with xed
wages provide clean evidence for reciprocity and accordingly appropriateness
of wage and e¤ort. Furthermore, the relevance of loss aversion and reference
dependent preferences could be shown in previous real e¤ort experiments on
piece rates. Since the current experiment is a kind of combination of those
why should we not observe both motivations together? Certainly an exact
test of the validity of this approach is necessary and should be subject to
further research.
Finally, the most important conclusion we draw is that the xed wage is
indeed relevant for the e¤ort decision, and this is true within an incentive
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contract. Apparently there is an incentive impact of the xed wage, so pay
attention to the xed pay!
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3.8 Appendix to Chapter 3
Proof. Proposition 2: The proof of Propsition 2 is quite similar to the one
of Proposition 1. We know that there must be a unique internal optimum.
Suppose that, e < eR, then e = c0 1 (r) must hold. Thus, the agent
chooses an e¤ort level to the left of the kink. This happens i¤
c0 1 (r) <
R  

()  < R  c0 1 (r)  .
The equation denes a unique cut-o¤ value for  such that e = c0 1 (r) i¤
 is smaller than the cut-o¤ value. For e > eR, the optimum is dened by
e = c0 1 (s) .
Consequently e must be located right of eR which occurs if
 > R  c0 1 (s)  .
This cut-o¤ value is strictly larger than the cut-o¤ value dened by e =
c0 1 (r) since r > s. It follows that in all other cases the agent chooses
e = eR.
Instructions (intermediate wage condition)
Welcome to this experiment! Please do not talk to other participants of
this experiment from now on! If you have any questions, please ask them
after you read these instructions carefully!
On the sheet you see a block of gures. Every block consists of two rows.
Your task at stage one is to sum up the digits per row. Thus, you calculate
two sums. (in the given example row 1: Sum of 67, row 2: Sum of 63).
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Example: Block 1
Result
4 1 7 5 6 4 6 6 1 4 1 7 5 6 4 Sum = 67 4
8 3 1 2 2 8 8 6 1 8 3 1 2 2 8 Sum = 63
At stage two you should compare if the sum in the upper row is greater or
less than the sum in the lower row. If the value of the upper row is greater,
you should subtract the value of the lower row from the upper row. If the
value of the upper row is less or equal, than the value of the lower row,
you should add both values up. This result should be lled into the column
Result(In the upper example: 4). Concerning the payment, only this nal
result is relevant!
Compensation scheme: For your participation you will receive 6e in
any case. In addition you will receive a piece rate of 0.15e for every correct
result. You will have 40 minutes to work on the task. You can split up
your time individually for solving the arithmetic problem (look above) or the
quizzes attached to this sheet. For solving the quizzes you will get no piece
rate.
After 40 minutes, you will receive a questionnaire. Your compensation
will only be paid out if you ll out the questionnaire completely. The money
will be paid out from 22.07 to 05.08.2004 daily between 10 a.m. and 12
p.m. in room 119b (o¢ ce: Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2). Please bring along your
personal anonymous ID-code. You nd the ID-Code in the right corner of this
cover sheet. Additionally, you nd it on a separate piece of paper attached
to your cover sheet. Please tear it o¤ and bring it with you when you come
to collect your payment. If you have any further questions now, please raise
your hand and wait for an instructor to come to your seat. Please dont ask
any questions aloud! Thank you for your participation!
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(1) (2) (3)
Number of point scorings
High xed wage 2.00 1.86 1.86
(1.6) (1.7) (1.7)
Low xed wage 2.88* 2.88* 2.55
(1.6) (1.6) (1.7)
Cologne -2.28* -2.26* -1.90
(1.3) (1.4) (1.4)
Income 1 0.77 0.81
(1.5) (1.5)
Income 2 0.75 0.25
(2.3) (2.3)
Income 3 4.69 -1.18
(5.4) (6.8)
Age 0.33
(0.2)
Constant 19.3*** 18.8*** 11.0*
(1.3) (1.5) (5.9)
Observations 181 181 181
R2 0.04 0.04 0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 3.3: Results OLS regression
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Transparency in
Team Production1
4.1 Introduction
In chapters 2 and 3 we have analyzed the impact of individual incentives on
the agents e¤ort decision. In many real world contexts however work results
cannot be assigned to a particular person but merely to a group of people
or a team. In that case any kind of performance dependent compensation is
accompanied by the danger of free-riding and consequently ine¢ cient e¤ort
levels. This problem has been discussed comprehensively in the theoretical
and empirical literature in recent decades (e.g. Holmström (1982), Alchian
and Demsetz (1972) and Newhouse (1973), or Prendergast (1999) for a sur-
vey).
However, it is sometimes claimed that peer pressure e¤ects induce team
members to work harder and reduce free-riding. But not much attention has
been given so far to the precise mechanism that triggers peer pressure. In
this chapter, we provide a theoretical explanation for peer pressure e¤ects
based on agentsinequity aversion. In a second step, we test the implications
of our theory in another real e¤ort experiment. One of the key objectives of
our investigation is to study the impact of the informational structure on the
1This chapter is based on Mohnen et al. (2006).
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development of peer pressure in teams.
We rst consider a simple model in which two agents can contribute to
a certain task and both are paid based on the total output of the team.
Individual contributions depend on the e¤ort exerted and a random compo-
nent. We compare two settings: In the rst setting, both agents can observe
their respective contributions only after the end of the game. In the second
setting each team member obtains intermediate information on the contri-
bution of his team partner at an interim stage. We assume that both agents
are inequity averse over their respective contributions, i.e. each dislikes con-
tributing more or less to the nal outcome than his team partner. We show
that inequity aversion indeed a¤ects the outcome, provided that interim in-
formation on the respective contributions is given. The key mechanism is
the following: When it has turned out that one of the agents has contributed
more to a task than his team partner an inequitable situation arises. The
team partner will have an incentive to reduce this inequity by exerting more
e¤ort in the following period. On the other hand, the agent who contributed
more has an incentive to reduce his e¤ort level. Hence, an interdependency
arises between past outcomes and future contributions. But this has an im-
portant e¤ect on the incentives to contribute early in the game as a higher
contribution in the present raises the coworkers willingness to raise his e¤ort
in the future. Hence, this e¤ect increases the marginal return of e¤ort and
leads to higher e¤ort levels early in the game if the respective contributions
are made transparent.
However, if individual contributions remain intransparent and become
known only at the end of the game, we show that inequity aversion has no
impact on equilibrium e¤ort levels as inequity averse agents act exactly like
purely selsh agents would.
We test several hypotheses derived from the model in a real e¤ort exper-
iment. Each of the participants in the experiment was requested to perform
a tedious counting task on a computer screen which was similar to CN task
described in Chapter 2. Teams of two participants were remunerated with a
linear piece rate based on the sum of correct answers of both participants. In
the rst condition participants learned the correct answers which their team
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partner attained at intermediate stages of the game. In the other condition
they received that information only at the end of the experiment. The main
hypotheses derived from the model are conrmed: Participants yield more
correct answers when knowing that their team mates would be informed
about the intermediate outcomes. In addition, we nd evidence that the
di¤erence between outcomes within the team in the previous period indeed
has a strong impact on individual outcomes in subsequent periods. Interest-
ingly we observe an asymmetry in the reaction not predicted by our simple
model: Whereas an agent who has contributed more than his colleague in
the previous period reduces his e¤ort strongly, having contributed less only
leads to a weak increase in future e¤ort.
Among the rst introducing the idea of peer pressure in economic team
models are Kandel and Lazear (1992). In their approach, team members can
choose certain actions that raise the cost of a reduction in individual produc-
tive e¤ort for the other team members. However, the mechanism by which
the costs of productive e¤ort are increased is not studied endogenously in
the model. Barron and Gjerde (1997) nd that the existence of peer pressure
can result in the optimality of lower powered incentives. Che and Yoo (2001)
show that team incentives are more e¤ective in an innitely repeated game
as team members can sanction past behavior of their colleagues. Knez and
Simester (2001) nd that the introduction of a company wide team incen-
tive scheme at Continental Airlines raised productivity signicantly. They
explain their result by claiming that mutual monitoring and peer pressure
e¤ects counterbalanced free-riding. Backes-Gellner et al. (2006) investigate
a Kandel-Lazear type peer pressure model and nd a concave relationship
between team size and peer pressure which they conrm by empirically an-
alyzing the e¤ort exerted in groups of founders.
There is some previous experimental evidence on peer pressure in teams.
Falk and Ichino (2006) show that subjects working at the same time in the
same room work harder than subjects in a control treatment with one person
working in a room all alone. In contrast to our study they remunerate their
subjects with a xed wage. Hence, increasing the others incentives to con-
tribute more which will be benecial in the future can be no motive in their
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experiment. Moreover, the paper does not give a theoretical explanation of
their results within an economic model. Sausgruber (2005) examines peer
e¤ects between teams rather than within teams. He nds that the average
contribution of the other team in the previous period is positively correlated
to the contribution of a person to the own team output in the current period.
Our investigation is of course also strongly related to the literature on so-
cial preferences. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
show that many experimental results can be explained when allowing for
the possibility that some agentsutility decreases in the inequality of payo¤s
between agents. Recently a literature has emerged analyzing the incentive
e¤ects of several contractual forms when agents are inequity averse. Exam-
ples are for instance Biel (2004), Englmaier and Wambach (2002), Demougin
and Fluet (2003), Grund and Sliwka (2005), or Itoh (2004).2 Most closely
related to the theoretical part of our investigation is Huck and Biel (2006)
who give a rationale for leadership behavior in a game in which two agents
are remunerated with a team incentive scheme. They show that output is
higher when one of the agents (i.e. the leader) can act as a rst mover as his
e¤ort level inuences his follower when the latter is inequity averse. Masclet
(2002), however, allows for punishment of shirking colleagues which is used
in order to achieve equity.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2 we
present the model where the theoretical results regarding the intransparent
and transparent setting are developed in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 respectively.
Furthermore the settings are compared in Section 4.2.3. The experimental
design and hypotheses are described in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. Section 4.3.3 deals
with the empirical results. The last section concludes.
4.2 The Model
To examine the e¤ects of transparency and inequity aversion on contributions
to a team task, we consider a model set-up with two agents as team members
2For an overview see for instance Englmaier (2004).
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and analyze their e¤ort decisions in a two-period model, t = 1; 2. Two risk
neutral agents i = 1; 2 are working in team.3 An agent is contribution yit
to the team output in period t consist of his e¤ort level but is additionally
a¤ected by some random noise component. Hence, in period t is contribution
to the team output is given by
yit = eit + "it (4.1)
where eit denotes the e¤ort exerted by agent i in period t. The random
components "it are identically and independently distributed and follow a
normal distribution "it  N (0; 2") :
The agentscosts of e¤ort in each period are represented by a quadratic
cost function, c
2
e2it with c > 0. Both agents receive a xed wage as well as
a team bonus  < 1 paid at the end of period 2 and hence the wage of an
agent i is given by
wi = + 
2X
t=1
(yit + yjt) for i = 1; 2: (4.2)
Given this compensation scheme, the variable payment depends on the team
output over both periods, i.e. the sum of the contributions of both team
members in both periods.
Furthermore, we assume that both agents are inequity averse over their
respective contributions. It is important to note that we assume that agents
care for inequity in total contributions and not in e¤ort levels alone. We
consider this as important for the following reason. Actual e¤ort levels are
not directly observable in many real world work contexts but only output
measures which are also a¤ected by external factors beyond the direct control
of individual employees. Thus, the utility loss from inequity probably is to a
large part driven by di¤erences in observed individual output contributions
rather than chosen e¤ort levels alone. Hence, the utility function of an agent
3We assume risk neutrality to nd clear evidence for the inequity aversion e¤ect. Oth-
erwise, both forces, the risk aversion and the inequity aversion would interact.
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over both periods is given by
ui = wi   
 
2X
t=1
(yit   yjt)
!2
  c
2
e2i1  
c
2
e2i2, (4.3)
where   0 denotes the degree of inequity aversion, yit is the agents own
contribution and yjt that of his respective colleague. Thus, the utility of
agent i equals his remuneration less his e¤ort costs in both periods and an
expression reecting the utility loss from inequity in contributions within the
team. It is obvious that the agents do not su¤er from inequity aversion when
both contribute equally over both periods. But if the sum of contributions
over both periods is not the same for both agents, the inequity aversion
leads to a loss in utility. Since it seems reasonable, that bigger di¤erences
lead to more than a proportional e¤ect on this disutility component than
small di¤erences in contributions, we model the inuence of the di¤erences
in contributions as a quadratic function. For simplicity, we assume that both
team members have the same degree of inequity aversion .
In our analysis we compare two cases. In the rst case both agents get
the information about their respective contribution to the team output at an
interim stage after the rst period. One possible interpretation would be that
they closely work together in a transparent environment and therefore can
observe their respective contributions after each period. Another explanation
would be that feedback is given by a central manager after the rst period
who informs both agents about each otherscontributions. We call this the
transparency case. In the second case this intermediate information is not
given but agents learn their respective contributions only after the second
period. This case is labeled intransparency case. Payo¤ functions are exactly
the same in both cases.4
4As we are interested in the impact of inequity aversion on e¤ort provision, we focus
on the agentsdecisions rather than on the princpals. Therefore we do not analyze the
principals optimal contracting. However, if agents are protected by limited liability, it
can easily be shown that the principal will choose  = 0 and  = 1=2 in both cases we
analyze below.
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4.2.1 Intransparency
We rst solve the game for the intransparency case where contributions are
unobservable at the interim stage after period 1. Here, both agents cannot
observe the yi1 between periods. We solve the game by backward induction.
Note that in period 2 each agent knows his own e¤ort level from period 1
and in equilibrium can infer the equilibrium e¤ort level of the other player.
We denote the equilibrium strategy of an agent i in period t by e^it. Thus, in
period 2 each agent i maximizes
Ei
"
+ 
2X
t=1
(yit + yjt)  

2P
t=1
(yit   yjt)
2#
  c
2
e2i2: (4.4)
The agent maximizes his expected utility consisting of his expected material
payo¤, his expected inequity costsand the costs of his e¤ort. Using that
E [x2] = V [x] + (E [x])2 the expression for the expected inequity costs can
be simplied and we obtain
E
"


2P
t=1
(eit + "it   e^jt   "jt)
2#
= 42" + 

2P
t=1
(eit   e^jt)
2
: (4.5)
It is interesting to note that inequity costs are not only inuenced by possi-
ble di¤erence in the agentse¤ort levels but also by the noise a¤ecting their
respective contributions. The noisier the environment, the larger is the prob-
ability that contributions di¤er even when e¤ort levels coincide. Hence, (4.4)
can be rewritten as
+ 
2P
t=1
(eit + e^jt)  42"   

2P
t=1
(eit   e^jt)
2
  c
2
e2i2: (4.6)
To maximize the expected utility we di¤erentiate (4.6) with respect to ei2
and obtain agent is reaction function
ei2 (ei1; e^j1; e^j2) =
   2  ei1  P2t=1 e^jt
c+ 2
:
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This is the best response of agent i given his own e¤ort level in the rst period
ei1 and the strategies of his colleague j in both periods. An agents e¤ort
level in period 2 will be higher, the higher the equilibrium strategies of his
counterpart j, and the lower, the higher his own actual e¤ort in period 1 has
been. Both e¤ects are stronger the higher the inequity aversion parameter
. The e¤ects are due to an agents potential utility loss from a guilty
consciencewhen he contributes less than his colleague. But for a given total
e¤ort exerted by his colleague, the more an agent has contributed in the past,
the less he has to work in the present to achieve equitable contributions.
In the intransparency case an agent knows in the rst period, that his
contributions will not be observed by the other agent before the second period
ends. Hence, the agent cannot react to his counterparts contribution. But
an agent i will anticipate that his rst period e¤ort choice will a¤ect his own
second period reaction ei2 (ei1; e^j1; e^j2).
Hence, agent i maximizes in period 1
max
ei1
+ 

ei1 + e

i2 (ei1; e^j1; e^j2) +
2P
t=1
e^jt

  42" (4.7)
 

ei1 + e

i2 (ei1; e^j1; e^j2) 
2P
t=1
e^jt
2
  c
2
(ei2 (ei1; e^j1; e^j2))
2   c
2
e2i1:
Solving this optimization problem, we obtain the following rst period reac-
tion function
ei1 =
 + 2
 P2
t=1 e^jt

c+ 4
:
By solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium, we obtain the following re-
sult:
Proposition 3 When agents cannot observe their respective contributions at
the interim stage after t = 1; equilibrium e¤ort levels are independent from
the agents degree of inequity aversion and are given by
eit =

c
for i = 1; 2 and t = 1; 2.
Proof: See Appendix.
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It is important to note that without transparency, the introduction of in-
equity aversion over contributions does not alter the equilibrium predictions
compared to a case where agents are purely selsh. As the agents do not re-
ceive any information about their colleagues contribution to the team result
after the rst period, agents cannot adapt their e¤ort choices contingent on
their observation of their colleagues contribution.
4.2.2 Transparency
In the transparency case, the intermediate contributions to the team output
of both agents are observed. We examine how the observability of yi1 and
yj1 inuences the agentsdecisions. Note that the agents are symmetrically
informed at the beginning of period 2 as both have observed the contributions
in the rst period y1t and y2t. Hence, in period 2 agent i maximizes his
expected utility
max
ei2
+  (yi1 + yj1 + ei2 + e^j2) (4.8)
 E (yi1   yj1 + ei2 + "i2   e^j2   "j2)2 yi1; yj1  c
2
e2i2:
This can be simplied and, from the rst order condition we get the following
reaction function
ei2(yi1; e^j2) =
   2 (yi1   e^j2)
2 + c
:
where yi1 := yi1   yj1.
Note that ei2 is increasing in e^j2 and yj1 and decreasing in yi1. Besides
the monetary motive, the agents e¤ort choice is guided by his objective to
minimize the expected disutility from inequity. An agent works the harder,
the more e¤ort is exerted by his colleague in equilibrium in the current period
and the higher the contribution of his colleague in the previous period has
been. He works the less, the more he himself has contributed in the previous
period.
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Substituting the optimal strategies of his colleague ej2 and solving for ei1
leads to the following result:
Proposition 4 In the transparency case, the equilibrium e¤ort levels in pe-
riod 2 are
ei2(yi1) =

c
  2
4 + c
yi1 for i = 1; 2 (4.9)
The second period e¤ort of an agent i is strictly decreasing in the di¤erence
of rst period contributions yi1 = yi1   yj1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Now, the e¤orts exerted in the second period depend upon the actual
output in the rst period. When the rst period contributions of both agents
di¤er, the agent with the higher contribution exerts a lower and the one with
the lower contribution chooses a higher second period e¤ort level than in the
case without transparency (or the case where all agents are purely selsh).
An agent whose rst contribution has turned out high, feels less obliged to
exert higher e¤ort levels in the second period. On the other hand, an agent
whose rst period contribution has been low, strives to make up for the
di¤erences in contributions by exerting a higher e¤ort level in the second
period. Only for y1 = 0 both agentse¤ort levels coincide.
In period 1 agent i maximizes
max
ei1
E
24+  2X
t=1
(yit + yjt)  
 
2X
t=1
(yit   yjt)
!235  c
2
e2i1   E
h c
2
e2i2
i
(4.10)
taking the e¤ect of ei1 on the equilibrium strategies in period 2 into account.
Again, as the situation is symmetric, agent js reaction function is sym-
metric, too. After substituting the reactions function of j in i; we get the
following result:
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Proposition 5 In the transparency case, the agents choose identical e¤ort
levels in period 1 given by
ei1 =

c
 6 + c
4 + c
for i = 1; 2: (4.11)
E¤orts are increasing in the degree of the agentsinequity aversion.
Proof: See Appendix.
The rst period equilibrium e¤ort is increasing in the degree of the agents
inequity aversion : The more inequity averse the agents are, the higher will
be the rst period e¤ort level.
4.2.3 A Comparison of both Settings
It is straightforward to compare the e¤ort decisions in both settings. When
interim contributions are unobservable, inequity averse agents act exactly
like purely selsh agents and equilibrium e¤ort levels coincide and are equal
to =c for both periods. However, in the transparent case the agents in gen-
eral choose di¤erent second period e¤ort levels to counterbalance inequitable
outcomes from the rst period. But note that from equation (4.9) we know
that
ei2 (yi1) + ej2 ( yi1) = 2
c
:
Hence, aggregate e¤ort levels do not di¤er between both settings in the sec-
ond period. The e¤ort adaptions chosen to counterbalance either higher or
lower contributions from the rst period exactly o¤set each other. The agent
who contributed more works less and the one with the smaller contribution
increases his e¤ort level by exactly the same amount.
However, comparing the rst period e¤orts for both informational settings
yields the following result:
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Proposition 6 In the transparent setting both agents exert higher rst period
e¤ort than in the intransparent setting as

c
 6 + c
4 + c
>

c
for  > 0. This leads to higher expected utilities for the agents when contri-
butions are made transparent at the interim stage.
Proof: See Appendix.
In the rst period, both team members always choose the same e¤ort level
within each situation but in the transparency case, they both work harder.
Hence, inequity aversion helps to reduce the free-rider problem even in a
nitely repeated game, but it does so only when intermediate contributions
are transparent. As higher e¤ort levels by an agent in the present increase
his team partners costs to free-ride in the second period due to a utility loss
caused by the inequity aversion it is rational to increase ones own e¤ort in
the rst period. Hence, this mechanism gives an explanation for observed
peer pressure e¤ects based on social preferences.
Furthermore note that by exerting higher e¤orts in the transparency case
the agents attain more e¢ cient outcomes. As it can easily be shown they
never exceed the e¤ort level chosen under full cooperation. Therefore the
agents are always better o¤ in a situation with transparent contributions.
Note also that the principal will always prefer a situation in which the agents
observe each otherscontributions at the interim stage providing him with
higher e¤orts in the rst period and thus higher total e¤ort. In the following
section we test whether these theoretical results are valid by examining the
behavior of participants in a real e¤ort experiment.
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4.3 Experimental Evidence
4.3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
Subjects were randomly assigned to a team consisting of two persons each.
The team partners were never exchanged, thus each participant kept his
counterpart for the entire duration of the experiment. Altogether 7 periods
were played each of which lasted 8 minutes. In all periods the participants
were o¤ered to work on a simple counting task which was similar to the CN
task in Chapter 2 but the subjects solved it on the computer. Periods 1 and
7 (i.e. the rst and the last period) were di¤erent from the other periods. In
these periods subjects were paid according to their individual performance
in the counting task. For each correct answer they received a piece rate of
0.14e which was directly transferred to their individual account. We will call
these periods the individual periods in the following. The individual periods
at the very beginning and at the end of the experiment were introduced to
provide individual ability measures for this specic task for each participant.
In addition we are able to observe whether learning or fatigue inuenced the
results.5
However, in all other periods (i.e. periods 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) the participants
had the choice between two options at each point in time: First, they could
again work on counting the correct number of sevens in blocks of random
numbers. In that case 0.14e were transferred to the team account for each
correct answer. After each period the amount of the team account was equally
divided between the two team members and we therefore call these periods
the team periods. But, alternatively, the subjects could push a time-out
button at any time during the team periods which caused the screen to be
blocked for 25 seconds. During this time they were not able to continue
with the counting task but were paid 0.10e to their individual account. We
introduced the time-out button to make sure that subjects had signicant
opportunity costs of working on the counting task.
Whenever an answer in the calculation task was incorrect 0.01e were
5For instance this might be worthwhile if we want to distinguish between fatigue and
an endgame e¤ect when performance happens to decrease in the last team period.
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subtracted from the individual account irrespective of the type of period (in-
dividual or team period). After each team period every subject was informed
about
 the number of blocks he had worked on in the previous period
 the number of correct answers he had given in the previous period
 the number of times he pushed the time-out button in the previous
period.
In order to check for the impact of the team mates performance on the in-
dividual e¤ort, we introduced two conditions. Subjects in the intransparent
condition merely received the information described above. In the trans-
parent condition however participants were additionally informed about the
number of correct answers provided by their respective counterpart.
Altogether 208 students of various faculties participated in the exper-
iment. We recruited all subjects using an online recruitment system by
Greiner (2003). We conducted 7 sessions in May 2006 at the Cologne Labora-
tory for Economic Research, University of Cologne and used the experimen-
tal software z-tree by Fischbacher (1999) for programming the experiment.
Each subject was seated in an own cabin with a computer terminal. The par-
ticipants were not given any oral instructions, instead all informations were
described on a sheet of paper laid out in each cabin.6 Additionally, the struc-
ture of the payo¤ function and other important features of the experimental
design were repeated on the computer screen before each period started. At
the end of the experiment all subjects were informed about the sum of their
earnings in the individual periods and the team periods. Additionally, they
were all paid a xed show up fee of 2.50e. On average the subjects earned
approximately 16e. The whole procedure took about 90 minutes.
4.3.2 Hypotheses
From the theoretical model developed in Section 4.2 we derive three main
hypotheses on the subjectsbehavior. Proposition 4 indicates that subjects
6For the printed instructions see appendix.
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will adapt their counting e¤ort levels according to the interim information.
Hypothesis 1: In the transparency condition the subjects having made the
higher team contribution in the previous period compared to the team
mate will decrease their e¤ort in the next period and vice versa.
Hypothesis 1 captures the e¤ect that the agents dislike di¤erences in con-
tributions between team members. Hence, the one who has taken an early
lead will reduce and the one who has fallen behind will feel obliged to raise
his e¤ort in order to counterbalance the previous period outcome di¤erence.
Moreover, we have seen in Proposition 5 that transparency leads to a re-
duction in free-riding causing higher rst period e¤ort choices. Therefore we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2a: In periods 2 to 5 outcomes are higher in the transparent
than in the intransparent setting.
This hypothesis illustrates the agentsincentives to exert higher e¤orts to
increase the team mates costs of free-riding. This e¤ect is likely to persist as
long as there is at least one subsequent period. However, in the last period
the outcome cannot inuence the team mates future behavior.
Hypothesis 2b: In the last team period (period 6), e¤orts decline in the
transparent condition and the di¤erence between the outcomes in the
two informational settings diminishes.
The aggregate results should therefore be equal for both settings in the
last period.
4.3.3 Results
Let us rst consider the subjectse¤ort adjustment depending on the relation
of their own contribution to the team output compared to the counterparts
contribution. We approximate the participantse¤ort by the number of cor-
rect answers given (score)7 to investigate this relation. Still, we have two
7The expressions in parentheses are the variable labels used in the following analysis.
71
further e¤ort measures to check the robustness of the score results which are
on the one hand the number of blocks the subject has worked on irrespective
of the correctness of the result (blocks), and on the other hand the number
of time outs the subject has taken (time outs).8 As e¤ort adjustment accord-
ing to the counterparts contribution is not possible for the intransparent
condition we restrict the analysis of the e¤ort adjustment to the data from
the transparent condition. Let us rst examine how a subjects change in
scored points from one period to the next is inuenced by the score di¤erence
within his team in the previous period. According to Hypothesis 1 we expect
that those subjects having taken a lead over their team mate in the previous
period will reduce their e¤ort in the next, while those team members who
have fallen behind will increase their e¤ort. To analyze this, we measure the
di¤erence in scores within in the team by taking the rst subjects score less
the second subjects score (team di¤erence). So for the subject who pro-
duced the higher score, the team di¤erence variable has a positive sign and
for the subject with the lower performance the team di¤erence variable has
a negative sign. Second, we approximate the participantse¤ort adjustment
by the score change variable. The score change is dened by the di¤erence
between a subjects score in the current period less the same subjects score
in the previous period. Thus, if a subject increased the score between two
consecutive periods, the score change is positive while it is negative if the
subject decreased the score. We predict a negative relationship between the
team di¤erence in the previous periods and the score change from the previ-
ous to the subsequent periods. Figure 4.1 shows this relationship for periods
3, 4, 5, and 6. We skip period 2 because there has not been a precedent team
period as period 1 is an individual period. According to Figure 4.1, indeed,
this negative relationship seems to exist. We test the results illustrated in
the previous gure by applying a xed e¤ects estimation which we restrict to
periods 2 to 6.9 The models in Table 4.1 examine the inuence of the team
di¤erence on the change between periods in the three performance measures
8Note that the relation between the measures score and blocks and e¤ort can be as-
sumed to be positive and that it should be negative for time outs.
9Period 2 is used only as a baseline for the changes in period 3.
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Figure 4.1: Relation between team di¤erence in t  1 and score change
(score, blocks and time out).10 Considering model (1) we observe a highly
signicantly negative inuence of the team di¤erence on the score change.
From that we may conclude that the more a subjects score exceeded the
counterparts score in the past period, the more the subject decreased his
e¤ort in the subsequent period. In turn the participants raised the score if
confronted with a negative team di¤erence. The models for block change (2)
and time out change (3) conrm this conclusion. Model (2) demonstrates
that higher performance di¤erences within the team do not only lead to a
decrease in the number of correct answers between the current and the previ-
ous period but also to a decrease in the number of blocks worked on. In turn
a higher performance di¤erence in the team causes the usage of the time-out
button to rise (see model (3)). It seems that the subject with the higher
outcome feels free to take time outs more often to counterbalance the team
di¤erence. This is in line with our theoretical predictions.
The estimations in Table 4.2 refer to the inuence of the sign of the team
10The variables block change and time out change are dened (analogously to score
change) as the di¤erences between the values of the respective measure in the current
period less the value of the measure in the previous period.
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(1)
Score
change
(2)
Blocks
change
(3)
Time outs
change
Team di¤erence -0.563*** -0.649*** 0.539***
in t-1 (0.054) (0.073) (0.061)
Constant -2.739*** -2.852*** 3.068***
(0.39) (0.53) (0.44)
Observations 352 352 352
Number
of subjects 88 88 88
R2 0.36 0.27 0.27
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Fixed e¤ects estimation (period dummies included)
Table 4.1: Fixed e¤ects estimation I
di¤erence illustrating the di¤erence between being the one who has had the
lead in the previous period (higher performer) and the one with the lower
team contribution (lower performer). The higher performer variable is de-
ned as the maximum of the subjects score less the counterparts score and
zero. Analogously the lower performer variable is dened as the maximum
of the counterparts score less the respective subjects score and zero. Thus,
in one period either the variable lower performer or the variable higher per-
former is positive, both are zero if both agents have contributed equally to
the team output in the previous period. Regarding models (1) and (2) we
observe a signicantly negative impact of being the higher performer. This
is very intuitive because the more a person exceeded his coworkers score in
the past period, the more he reduces the current e¤ort to enforce equality in
contributions. This e¤ect occurs for the score change and the blocks change.
The coe¢ cient for time outs change is of course positive as taking more time
outs indicates lower e¤ort on the task. Hence, the analyses of all three per-
formance measures provide evidence for our theoretical predictions. For the
lower performer variable all coe¢ cients show the opposite sign. Hence, the
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(1)
Score
change
(2)
Blocks
change
(3)
Time outs
change
Higher performer -0.987*** -1.092*** 0.932***
in t-1 (0.081) (0.11) (0.093)
Lower performer 0.139* 0.207* -0.145
in t-1 (0.081) (0.11) (0.093)
Constant 2.338*** 0.398 0.518
(0.51) (0.72) (0.59)
Observations 352 352 352
Number
of subjects 88 88 88
R2 0.45 0.33 0.34
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Fixed e¤ects estimation (period dummies included)
Table 4.2: Fixed e¤ects estimation II
impact of performing less than the counterpart seems to be consistent with
our theory as well but is less pronounced in e¤ect size and level of signif-
icance. This is particularly interesting with regard to our model in which
we assume that di¤erences in contributions are equally detrimental for ad-
vantageous and disadvantageous inequality. In contrast to that the subjects
behavior implies that they su¤er less from being the lower performer than
from being the higher performer and therefore make stronger e¤ort adjust-
ments in the latter case. Yet, taking the results together we may conclude
that Hypothesis 1 is at least partly conrmed. Although we have seen that
subjects adapted their e¤ort according to their team matesscores, it is not
clear whether this behavior leads to a net increase in scores. Therefore we
compare the scores between the transparent and the intransparent condition.
In Figure 4.2 the point scorings over periods are displayed. Again we only
consider the team periods 2 to 6. The gure indicates that subjects in the
intransparent condition yield lower scores than those in the transparent con-
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Figure 4.2: Scores over periods by condition
dition. In addition there seems to be a considerable endgame e¤ect as scores
drop in the transparent condition in the last period.11 In the intransparent
condition the e¤ect seems to occur as well but appears to be less pronounced.
We analyze each period separately with a non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U-
test to check whether the di¤erences between conditions are signicant. If we
take the mean score per team for each period we obtain the following results
which are illustrated in Table 4.3. For periods 2 to 5 we nd signicantly
higher scores for those subjects who were informed about their team mates
performance between periods. This conrms our Hypothesis 2a. Hence, we
may conclude that indeed transparent conditions in team production enforce
higher e¤ort levels and reduce free-riding. However, we cannot conclude from
that result alone whether the underlying motive reected by our theory of
inequity aversion is valid. It could as well be that participants in the trans-
parent condition developed a feeling of commitment or team spirit as they
got more information about their team mates. Yet, considering period 6
11The di¤erence between period 5 and 6 is highly signicant for the transparent condition
if we use the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test for dependent samples (absolute
z-value 4:720).
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Periods Transparent vs. intransparent condition
2 (3:467)***
3 (3:360)***
4 (3:075)***
5 (2:259)**
6 (0:965) not signicant
*** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Absolute value of z-statistic in parentheses
Table 4.3: Results Mann-Whitney-U-test
we do not nd signicant di¤erences between the conditions anymore. This
seems to be an endgame e¤ect implying that the subjects in our experiment
did not exert more e¤ort due to a stronger feeling of commitment or team
spirit. Rather than that they rationally anticipated the positive impact of
a currently higher e¤ort on the team mates future e¤ort. Of course, in the
last period this motive became irrelevant as there was no subsequent period.
Therefore the experimental results provide evidence for the validity of the
theoretical approach in Section 4.2. One might also argue that fatigue caused
the scores to decline in period 6. However, using the Wilcoxon matched pairs
signed rank test for dependent samples, we nd a highly signicant increase
in scores in period 7 which is an individual period (absolute z-value 5:774).
This indicates that subjects might not have su¤ered from fatigue but indeed
did not have incentives to stick to the high e¤ort level in period 6 providing
evidence for Hypothesis 2b.
4.4 Discussion
In this chapter we have theoretically and experimentally analyzed the impact
of inequity aversion on e¤ort exertion on a team task in order to provide a
possible mechanism for peer pressure. We have shown that not only in theory
but also in the experiment the e¤ect strongly depends on the informational
setting in which the task is solved.
The theoretical results suggest that when there is no intermediate infor-
mation about the team mates contribution to the team output, the agents
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inequity aversion does not inuence in the choice of e¤ort. Hence, the play-
ers always act identically to purely selsh ones. However, if the team mates
contribution can be observed at an interim stage, the agents deviate from
the purely selsh choice to minimize their costs of inequity in contributions.
Therefore they adjust their e¤ort levels in the second period such that the
agent having worked less increases and the other one decreases his e¤ort.
The subjects in our experiment indeed adapted their e¤ort according to
the interim information they received about their counterpartscontribution
such that they counterbalanced contributions to increase equity. However,
in contrast to our model they did not seem to adjust in a symmetric way.
According to the observed behavioral pattern it seems that subjects who ex-
erted higher performance and therefore were in a disadvantageous position
strongly decreased their e¤ort in the subsequent period. However, those par-
ticipants having had an advantage due to having been the lower performing
team member still felt the need to reduce inequity by increasing e¤ort but
to a lower extend. This led to a less pronounced absolute adjustment for
the lower performers. The notion of an asymmetric e¤ect of advantageous
and disadvantageous inequity has also been pointed out by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) which seems to be reected in this experiment.
Another conclusion from the theoretical model is that the later period
e¤ort adjustment, being anticipated in the earlier period, leads to higher
rst period e¤ort choices. That is, agents work harder in the early in the
game to increase the team mates costs of free-riding and therefore his future
e¤ort adjustment. Hence, the total sum of e¤orts is greater in the transparent
than in the intransparent case.
Indeed our experimental data provide evidence for a positive impact of
transparent conditions in team production on e¤ort provision. Thus, we can
conrm that transparency of individual contributions might help to reduce
free-riding. However, when the time horizon is xed in which a team works
together in the same formation, the cooperation within the team might break
down near the end.
All in all the data seem to conrm the theoretical results but yet there
are some limitations to the interpretation. For simplicity we neglected the
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question of individual abilities in the model and in the experiment. In the
model we assumed that agents are equally productive. This assumption is of
course violated in the experiment in which the subjects certainly had di¤erent
abilities to solve the counting task. Still, including abilities into the model
might provide interesting insights especially if each agent has more accurate
information about his own ability than about his team mates. Then, the
team members might try to use their rst period e¤ort as a signal of their
ability.
Another important issue is that the model is limited to two periods while
the experiment lasted for 5 team periods so that the experimental design does
not reect the theoretical set-up precisely. Yet, the greater number of periods
was necessary in the experiment to give the participants the chance to learn
and to understand the experimental design while analyzing the model over
5 periods would add much complexity but probably little to the results.
The model as well as the experiment show that the agents are better o¤
in a setting in which the counterparts contributions are revealed. Thus, we
may conclude that transparency leads to more e¢ cient outcomes and should
therefore be preferred from a social welfare point of view. Hence, the main
practical implication seems to be that transparent work environments might
be desirable in rms when employees work in groups. If workers adhere to
a social norm evoking feelings of guilt or anger respectively for di¤erences
in team contributions, transparency might enhance the chance to develop
benecial mutual monitoring and in turn yield an e¤ective reduction in free-
riding.
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4.5 Appendix to Chapter 4
Proof. Proposition 3: In period 1 an agent maximizes (4.7) taking into
account his own second period reaction function ei2 (ei1; e^j1; e^j2) and the equi-
librium strategies of his team partner in both periods. As ei2 will be chosen
to maximize exactly the same expression given ei1 we can use the Envelope
Theorem. Partially di¤erentiating (4.7) with respect to ei1 we obtain
   2

ei1 + e

i2 (ei1; e^j1; e^j2) 
2P
t=1
e^jt

  cei1 = 0:
Substituting ei2 (ei1; e^j1; e^j2) =
 2

ei1 
P2
t=1
e^jt

c+2
yields
   2
 
ei1 +
   2  ei1  P2t=1 e^jt
c+ 2
 
2P
t=1
e^jt
!
  cei1 = 0,
   2
 
 + 2
 P2
t=1 e^jt

c+ 2
 
2P
t=1
e^jt
!
=

c+ 2   4
2
c+ 2
ei1

ei1 ,
   2
 
   c  P2t=1 e^jt
c+ 2
!
=

c2 + 4
c+ 2

ei1 ,
ei1 =
 + 2
P2
t=1 e^jt
c+ 4
:
The second period e¤ort therefore becomes:
ei2 =
1
c+ 2
 
   2 + (2   c  4)
P2
t=1 e^jt
c+ 4
!
=
 + 2
P2
t=1 e^jt
c+ 4
:
Hence, it follows that ei1 = ei2 =
 
 + 2
P2
t=1 e^jt

= (c+ 4) =: ei: We can
substitute the reaction functions of agent j and obtain ei1 = ei2 =

c
:
Proof. Proposition 4: Using that E [x2] = V [x] + (E [x])2 ; the expression
for the expected inequity costs can be simplied and becomes
E

(yi1   yj1 + ei2 + "i2   e^j2   "j2)2

= 

22" + (yi1   yj1 + ei2   e^j2)2

:
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Hence, (4.4) can be simplied and agent i maximizes
max
ei2
+  (yi1 + yj1 + ei2 + e^j2)  22"    (yi1   yj1 + ei2   e^j2)2  
c
2
e2i2:
From the rst order condition we obtain the reaction function
ei2(y1; e^j2) =
   2 (yi1   e^j2)
2 + c
: (4.12)
From where we get the equilibrium strategies.
Proof. Proposition 5: In period 1 agent i maximizes
E
24+  2X
t=1
(yit + yjt)  
 
2X
t=1
(yit   yjt)
!235  c
2
e2i1   E
h c
2
(ei2(yi1))
2
i
(4.13)
where
E
24+  2X
t=1
(yit + yjt)  
 
2X
t=1
(yit   yjt)
!235 (4.14)
= +   (ei1 + e^j1 + E [ei2(yi1) + ej2( yi1)])
 E (ei1 + "i1   e^j1   "j1 + ei2(yi1) + "i2   ej2( yi1)  "j2)2
As
E [ei2(yi1) + ej2( yi1)] = 2
c
and
E [ei2(yi1)  ej2( yi1)] =   4
4 + c
yi1:
(4.14) is equivalent to
+ 

ei1 + e^j1 +
2
c

 E
"
ei1 + "i1   e^j1   "j1   4
4 + c
yi1 + "i2   "j2
2#
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where the expected value of the inequity costsare
V
h
ei1 + "i1   e^j1   "j1   4(4+c)y1 + "i2   "j2
i
+

ei1   e^j1 + E
h
  4
(4+c)
y1
i2
= V
h
1  4
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
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i
+
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2
=

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2
+ 1

22" +

1  4
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2
(ei1   e^j1)2 : (4.15)
Using the reaction function given in Proposition 4, the expected second pe-
riod e¤ort costs are
E
h c
2
(ei2(yi1))
2
i
= E
"
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2

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  2
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=
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2
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2
+


c
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2#
:
Hence, putting it all together, by substituting expected inequity costs (4.15)
as well as expected second period e¤ort costs (4.16) the agents optimization
problem (4.13) becomes
max
ei1
+ 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c

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rst order condition is
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leading to the reaction function
ei1 =
6+c
4+c

c
+ 2 2+c
(4+c)2
e^j1
1 + 2 2+c
(4+c)2
:
Solving for the rst period equilibrium strategies yields the given result.
Proof. Proposition 6: Agent is utility is
+ 3
2
c
  42": (4.17)
in the intransparent setting and
+
22
c

6 + c
4 + c
+ 1

  22"
"
1  4
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2
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#
(4.18)
 c
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2
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2
2c
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#
in the transparent setting. Checking whether (4.18) is greater than (4.17),
we obtain  
83 + 32c

22" +
 
32 + c
 2
c
> 0:
As all   0 and c > 0 the inequation is always valid.
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Instructions (intransparent condition)
Welcome to this experiment:
Please read these instructions carefully:
 All decisions you make in this experiment are anonymous
 At the end of the experiment you will also be paid anonymously
 During the experiment no communication is allowed
Procedure:
This experiment consists of 7 periods, each of which lasts for 8 minutes.
Periods 1 and 7 di¤er from rounds 2 to 6.
Periods 1 and 7 are played as follows:
You are requested to count the number of the Sevens(the digit 7) in a block
of random numbers. You enter this number in the corresponding box and
conrm your choice with OK.
Payo¤ for period 1 and period 7:
For each correct answer you receive 14 Cent.
ATTENTION: For each wrong answer 1 Cent will automatically be sub-
tracted from your individual account.
Periods 2 to 6 of this experiment are played as follows:
You will be randomly assigned to another participant where the two of you
form a team. This assignment remains the same for the whole experiment.
That is that you play with the same counterpart from period 2 to period 6.
However, you and your counterpart stay anonymous.
In periods 2 to 6 you can choose between two options:
1. You can work on the block of random numbers and count the numbers
of the Sevensin this block (analogously to round 1 and 7).
OR
2. You can take a time out by pressing the time outbutton. If you press
the time outbutton the counting task is blocked and you cannot continue
working on any block of random numbers for 25 seconds.
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Payo¤ for period 2 to period 6:
1. For each correct answer in the counting task, 14 Cent will be paid into
your team account. For each correct answer your counterpart gives, 14 Cent
will also be paid into your the team account.
The team account will be equally divided between you and your counterpart
at the end of each period.
2. Each time you press the time outbutton 10 Cent will be paid into
your individual account.
ATTENTION: For each wrong answer 1 Cent will automatically be sub-
tracted from your individual account.
After each period you will see a table on the screen displaying the following
information:
1. The number of blocks you nished in the previous period
2. The number of correct answers you gave in the previous period
3. The number of time outs you took in the previous period
The table with the details for the particular period looks as follows:
Screenshot
Your counterpart receives the same information about his own performance.
Neither you nor your counterpart learn about the number of correct answers
the other team member gave in the respective round. After the last period
(period 7) you will be informed about your total payo¤. In addition to that
you receive a show up fee of 2.50e. Please stay at your seat until we call
on your cabin number. Please bring along these instructions and your cabin
number. Thank you for your participation!
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Chapter 5
Performance Feedback and the
Role of Honesty1
5.1 Introduction
In light of various religious commandments and folk wisdom sayings from
around the world, most societies seem to adhere to ethical standards that
proscribe lying. However, standard economists claim that the completely
selsh homo economicus uses dishonesty whenever it serves to maximize his
own utility. In many situations in everyday and economic life we depend on
information provided by other people which we cannot prove to be correct.
In turn, losing trust in other peoples statements due to negative experiences
with deception, this might result in considerable costs for the respective or-
ganization or society. While society may bear the cost of individualslies, for
the liar dishonesty seems to be particularly attractive in situations character-
ized by a conict of interest. Evidence for this has been found in studies on
cheap talk games (for theoretical models see Park (2005) and his literature
overview; for experimental studies see e.g. Charness (2000); Crawford (1998)
provides a survey of experiments with cheap talk). In a recent experimental
study Gneezy (2005) examined deception in situations with a conict of in-
terest. He nds that the fraction of subjects utilizing lies strongly depends
1This chapter is based on Mohnen and Pokorny (2006b).
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on the consequences that arise from lying. If it is more benecial for them,
subjects lie more often. Yet Gneezy (2005) found that subjects also care
about the consequences the lies have on their counterpart. Thus, if decep-
tion strongly reduces their counterparts payo¤, they will refrain from lying
more frequently than if there is little impact on their counterparts payo¤.
With regard to organizations we often discuss the conict of interest be-
tween principal and agent. When information asymmetries arise, these con-
icts can have negative e¤ects on social welfare. One possible information
asymmetry might be the principal having information on the agents pro-
ductivity or ability to accomplish a certain task. Bénabou and Tirole (2003)
develop a similar approach by assuming that the principal has better infor-
mation on the agents e¤ort costs. In this context they examine the role of
bonus payments as a signal of task attractiveness. Related to Bénabou and
Tirole (2003) we make the assumption, that if an agent enters a new job his
employer has a better perception of how capable the employee is to fulll
his job than the agent himself does. As he is new, he typically does not
know how well-matched his abilities are with the tasks corresponding to the
job. Due to more experience an employer gets a good impression about the
employees actual ability for a certain task when observing him working on
the job. Hence, the employee depends on the employers feedback concerning
his actual ability. Many rms try to overcome the described asymmetry by
conducting feedback talks so that the employee receives the information gath-
ered through observation. However, as we will show, the employer might not
give feedback on the employees ability honestly. The employer, anticipating
how the sta¤ will react to the feedback information, might have an incen-
tive to give strategic rather than truthful feedback.2 Therefore we question
whether an employee can always trust the information he is given in feedback
discussions.
2In the literature we nd a huge amount of psychological studies on feedback, for an
overview see Latham and Locke (1990), Latham and Locke (1991) or Kluger and DeNisi
(1996). Whereas in the economic literature, feedback in an employer-employee relation-
ship is - to the best of our knowledge - so far not well analyzed. Mohnen and Pokorny
(2005) provide a simple economic model on the agents reaction to feedback and test their
implications using an experimental data set.
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Suppose there is a set of heterogenous employees in which some demon-
strate high and some demonstrate low ability for the work. Then the question
arises: should the employer be honest with the full range of employees and
truthfully reveal their individual abilities to them. To answer this question,
it is important to consider the employees reaction to this feedback, taking
into account that his boss can decide whether to give feedback or not and
whether to lie or not. Whenever employees are interested in their production
output they produce, their own ability to do the task becomes an important
piece of information for them. For example, a candid assessment of their
ability might be important to an employee if he is paid an output-contingent
wage as in chapters 2 and 3 or if the output inuences his future career
opportunities.
Obviously, in these cases, people will adapt their e¤ort levels if they
learn that they are more or less productive because their marginal returns
are higher or lower than they expected a priori. Therefore giving truthful
feedback does not lead to higher prots for the employer in every case. Since
the employers interest is to encourage her sta¤ to work hard, she would
have an incentive to tell each of them that they have high ability if they
believed her feedback information naively. The rationale behind this is the
following: Given an performance-dependent wage, an employee will work
more if he believes that he has a high ability because high achievers have
higher marginal returns than those with low ability. Thus, the employer
might not be well advised to give every employee honest feedback on their
ability, if in some cases, honest feedback would yield lower returns for her.
In this chapter, we try to shed light on this conict of interest in two
steps. First, we analyze a two-period signaling game in which the principal
knows her agents ability perfectly after the rst period while the agent does
not. We assume that there are two types of agents, those with high ability
and those with low ability, where the agents ability is equivalent to his work
productivity. In both periods the agent makes an e¤ort decision and his wage
is contingent on the output he produces. The agents output is a¤ected by
his actual ability for the task and the e¤ort he makes. After the rst period,
the principal can give positive (ability is high), negative (ability is low) or no
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feedback to the agent. If deception (i.e. giving positive feedback although the
true ability is low and vice versa) does not generate any costs, no separating
equilibria exist in the game. As merely pooling equilibria can be established,
the ability information will never be revealed and consequently the agent
will choose an optimal e¤ort level according to his a priori expectation of
his ability. Introducing positive costs of lying makes separating equilibria
feasible provided that these (signaling) costs are su¢ ciently high. In these
equilibria, the agents actual ability is revealed directly or indirectly by the
feedback information of the principal. Thus, our (1.) main result is: If
the costs of lying are su¢ ciently high, separating equilibria are feasible and
therefore the feedback information is informative. Additionally, we examine
the impact of the height of the principals marginal return on the agents
e¤ort and obtain the (2.) main result: If the principal benets less from the
agents e¤ort, i.e. her marginal returns are lower for each e¤ort unit exerted
by the agent, she is less likely to lie. As the returns from deception decrease
with the marginal returns from the agents e¤ort, she has a lower incentive
to lie for any given costs of lying.
In the second part of the chapter we test these theoretical results in a
laboratory experiment in which the principals might have incentives to give
positive feedback to their agents independent of the true ability. Similar
to the theoretical model we matched one principal to one agent for two
periods. Deviating from the previous chapters, we do not use a real e¤ort
task. Instead the agents chose an abstract e¤ort level and had to bear the
respective monetary costs of e¤ort in each of the periods.3 After the rst
period the principal was informed about both, the agents actual ability and
his output, and decided whether she wanted to give feedback to the agent
or not. If she decided to give feedback she could choose between positive
(ability is high) or negative (ability is low) feedback. We did not introduce
monetary costs of lying. Thus, any deception did not directly a¤ect the
principals monetary payo¤ in the experiment. Hence, the costs of lying are
an individuals psychological costs.
3However, a replication of this experiment with a real e¤ort task might be very inter-
esting.
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According to our theoretical framework, we ran two main conditions: a
baseline and a low return condition. In the latter, we decreased the princi-
pals returns on the output produced by the agent compared to the baseline
condition. This allowed us to examine whether the principals lie less often if
lying becomes less attractive monetarily.
Our experimental data give evidence for the following conclusions: Prin-
cipals give positive feedback less frequently if matched to a low ability agent
than if matched to a high ability agent. This indicates that they do consider
the true ability when giving feedback and therefore the existence of costs of
lying. In contrast to our theoretical results and to Gneezy (2005) we do not
nd more deception with higher returns on the agentse¤orts. Instead we
observe exactly the opposite pattern with decreasing frequency of deception
with higher returns on lying. So apparently lower returns do not enhance
honesty but decrease the fraction of honest feedback.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: In Section 5.2 we
analyze the signaling model. Section 5.3 describes the experimental design
and procedures. We derive hypotheses in Section 5.4 and present the exper-
imental results in Section 5.5. The last section concludes the chapter.
5.2 Theory
5.2.1 Model Set-up
We analyze a two-period model with riskneutral parties. A principal employs
an agent whose ability a is unknown to both of them ex ante. In each period,
the agent produces an output yt which is linear in his chosen e¤ort level et
with yt (a; et) = a  et; t = 1; 2. E¤ort is assumed to be observable but not
veriable. The agents ability a to produce the output yt can be either low
or high, i.e. a 2 faL; aHg with E [a] = a and aL < a < aH . The prior
distribution is such that high ability aH occurs with probability  and low
ability aL with probability 1  . Further, we assume quadratic e¤ort costs of
the form c(et) = 12e
2
t and a linear wage w(yt) =   yt is paid by the principal
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in each period where  > 0. Hence, the agents utility in period t is given by
UAt =   yt(et; a) 
1
2
e2t (5.1)
and the principals net payo¤ on the agents e¤ort equals
W Pt = (   )  yt(et; a) (5.2)
where  > . The parameter  represents the returns on the agents output
for the principal. Hence,    is the net return on output after the variable
compensation has been paid. Naturally, the players interests are not com-
pletely in line because the principal wants her agent to exert as much e¤ort
as possible but the agent has to bear the respective costs of e¤ort.
When only the prior information about his actual ability is available to
him, the agent would choose an e¤ort level e according to
et () =  [  aH + (1  )  aL] =   a  e (5.3)
in order to maximize the expected value of his periodic utility function (5.1).
Note that the agents e¤ort decision depends on his ability which is unknown
to him ex ante.
However, in this setting the principal has the opportunity to give feedback
to her agent after period t = 1. The principal learns whether the agents
actual ability is low with aL or high with aH . The idea behind this is the
following: Due to more experience the principal is able to determine if her
agent has high or low ability a. Given this information the principal can
decide if and how she wants to give feedback on ability to the agent. For this
purpose we assume that the principal can select one option from the following
set f 2 ff0; fL; fHg, where f0 denotes the case in which the principal gives no
feedback at all. Furthermore, fL states that the actual ability is low which
is negative feedback and fH species that the actual ability is high which is
positive feedback. Recall that the agent cannot verify the principals feedback
until the game ends.
This set-up constitutes a signaling game with three possible actions from
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which the principal can choose. After observing the principals feedback
signal, the agent might update his beliefs about his own ability, namely
calculate a posterior belief that his actual ability is high. We will refer to
this posterior probability as  (f) in the following (o¤ equilibrium beliefs are
denoted by e (f)). As a consequence, the agent will base his second period
e¤ort decision on this updated information. The key question is, can the
agent trust the information revealed in the feedback signal or not?
When giving feedback, the principal can deceive the agent in two ways:
First, she can tell the agent that the actual ability is low when it is in fact
high. Second, she can tell him that the actual ability is high even though
it is low. The latter option is much more attractive for the principal if the
agent naively trusts the principals feedback. Nevertheless let us assume that
in both cases the principal has to bear constant costs l  0 if she lies to her
agent.4 These costs are equal for both cases of deception. If she gives no
feedback no costs of lying arise. The crucial issue is whether it is in the
principals best interest to tell the truth.
Finally, we summarize the time structure of the game:
 In t = 1 the agent chooses an e¤ort level e1.
 Afterwards the principal observes the agents e¤ort and his ability and
decides whether or not to give feedback to her agent. The available
set of feedback signals is f 2 ff0; fL; fHg, i.e. giving no feedback, or
claiming the actual ability is high or low. By assumption deception
generates costs l  0 for the principal. The agent receives the signal f .
 Given this feedback information f; the agent makes a second e¤ort
decision e2 in period t = 2:5
 Both parties receive their respective payo¤s.
4Note that a standard homo economicus would surely feature l = 0.
5Besides, we assume that the agent cannot quit the contract after the rst period. He
must stay in the rm in period t = 2: The same is true for the principal, she cannot
lay o¤ her agent and replace him with another employee. With this assumption we want
to capture the feature that the labor market does not provide arbitrary job alternatives.
Otherwise, one could think of an agent leaving the rm after receiving a negative feedback
signal fL:
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This situation constitutes a dynamic game with asymmetric information.
Thus, the equilibrium concept is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium characterized
by
- the principals strategy described by a combination of f 2 ff0; fL; fHg for
both outcomes of the actual ability,
- a posterior probability  (f) that the actual realization of the agents ability
is high characterizing the agents beliefs after having observed the principals
feedback decision, and
- the agents strategy denoted by an e¤ort level in each period, i.e. e1 for
period 1 and e2() for period 2.
The results are developed in the subsequent section.
5.2.2 Theoretical Results
It turns out that the agents equilibrium strategy in t = 1 is easy to analyze:
In equilibria in which the principal plays a strategy which is not contingent on
the agents rst period e¤ort, (5.3) maximizes the agents utility in period 1.
Then, the optimal e¤ort choice is based on the agents prior belief e1 = e

1().
A strategy contingent on e1 can only be part of an equilibrium if the principal
is indi¤erent between two feedback decisions. As will become clear, this does
not arise in the generic cases. Hence, we focus on those equilibria in which the
principal does not condition her feedback on the agents rst period e¤ort.
The agents e¤ort decision in t = 2 depends on his updated information,
i.e. e2 = e

2(): Consider a situation in which the agent was naive such that
he believed that the feedback information would always be correct. Then he
would choose
  aH  eH
when receiving positive feedback and
  aL  eL
when hearing negative feedback. However, the principal can act strategi-
cally when giving feedback. Therefore, we examine which perfect Bayesian
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equilibria exist in the described set-up. In the following we focus on the
second period as the e¤ort level in the rst period is (5.3). In the appendix,
a detailed derivation of the existing equilibria can be found.6
Proposition 7 A separating equilibrium exists in which all types give honest
feedback when the costs of lying are su¢ ciently high according to
l    aL [aH   aL] (   ) (5.4)
i.e. the principal gives positive feedback fH if the actual ability is high and
negative feedback fL otherwise. If the costs of lying are zero, there are no
separating equilibria in the game in which the principal gives honest feedback
for one or both ability realizations.
Proof: See Appendix.
When the described equilibrium exists, the principals returns on decep-
tion are too low compared to the corresponding costs and therefore honesty
pays o¤ for her. As the costs of lying represent the signaling costs in this
game, separating equilibria never exist for zero costs of lying. The sim-
ple intuition is the following: when there are zero costs of lying a principal
employing a low ability agent will always imitate the signal of a principal
employing a high ability agent because with no costs of lying every signal is
free. Consequently, only pooling equilibria are feasible. However, if costs of
lying are su¢ ciently high a separating equilibrium exists in which the prin-
cipal always tells the truth. Only in the latter case does the feedback indeed
contain valuable information.
We obtain a similar separating equilibrium under the same conditions in
which the principal gives positive feedback to a high ability agent but no
feedback to a low ability agent. That is, the principal does not lie but avoids
truthful feedback for low ability agents.
If the costs of lying decrease, deception becomes more attractive to the
principal in the case of a low ability agent. Thus, for su¢ ciently low costs, we
6For simplicity we do not consider any hybrid equilibria.
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nd that all principals will give positive feedback, i.e. claim that the agents
actual ability is high independent of the true realization.
Proposition 8 With su¢ ciently low costs of lying, namely
l    aL [aH   aL] (   ) (   e(f)) (5.5)
there is a pooling equilibrium in which the principal always reports that the
true ability is high, i.e. gives positive feedback.
Proof: See Appendix.
As decreasing costs of lying represent lower signaling costs, reporting
high ability when the true ability is low becomes more attractive. Then the
principal is more likely to pretend that the actual ability is high even if it
is low. Note that the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 7 and
the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 8 can never coexist for given costs of
lying l as long as  < 1. That is, we have separating equilibria for higher
and pooling equilibria for lower costs of lying.
An important question with regard to the described setting is whether
the revelation of information pays o¤ in terms of e¢ ciency. For an e¢ ciency
analysis we compare the ex ante expected social welfare of the no feedback
pooling equilibrium with a separating equilibrium. In the no feedback pooling
equilibrium the principal does not have to bear any costs of lying, so it is the
most benecial pooling equilibrium for him. As all pooling equilibria lead
ex ante to the same expected utility for the agent, the no feedback pooling
equilibrium is the most e¢ cient one. Furthermore, neither the principals
nor the agents ex ante expected utility di¤ers across the two separating
equilibria. Hence, both separating equilibria are equally e¢ cient and we
can select any of them for comparison to the no feedback pooling situation.
Comparing the outcomes of the two types of equilibria, yields the following
result:
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Proposition 9 In any separating equilibrium the ex ante expected utility of
both agent and principal is higher than in any pooling equilibrium. Hence,
the social welfare is higher as well.
Proof: See Appendix.
In a separating situation the true ability is revealed, enabling the agent
to adjust the optimal e¤ort level to the new information, i.e. he chooses
a high e¤ort level when the true ability turns out to be high and a low
one when it turns out to be low. In contrast to that, he does not learn
the ability information in the pooling equilibrium. So the agent exerts an
e¤ort corresponding to the ex ante expected value of ability. This e¤ort level
is from an ex post point of view either too high (when the true ability is
low) or too low (when the true ability is high). It follows that the agent
is better o¤ in a separating equilibrium. The principal also benets from
the separating equilibrium which is driven by the agents productivity. Ex
ante the expected e¤ort exerted by the agent is equal in the pooling and
the separating equilibria. However, in the separating equilibria the agent
exerts high second period e¤ort when he is more productive and low second
period e¤ort when he is less productive. So altogether the principal prots
more from the higher e¤ort level expended by an agent with high ability
than he su¤ers from the lower e¤ort level demonstrated by an agent with
low ability making the separating equilibria more benecial than the pooling
equilibria. From that we can draw the conclusion that even the principal
is better o¤ in a separating equilibrium. Thus, both parties benet from
separating equilibria and consequently social welfare is higher compared to
any pooling equilibrium.7
Moreover, we consider the case in which the principals return on the
agents e¤ort can vary. Then, the parameter  in equation (5.2) is di¤erent for
various kinds of jobs. Hence, we obtain the following e¤ect on the separating
equilibrium described in the following Corollary:
7Here the princpal faces a commitment problem. However, a credible commitment
of the principal to always honestly report the agents true ability would have a positive
impact on social welfare.
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Corollary 10 If the principals return  increases, the separating equilibrium
in which both types of principals give truthful feedback becomes less probable
as condition (5.4) gets more restrictive.
Since the returns on lying increase relatively to the constant costs of lying,
it is more likely that the principal deceives the agent if the true ability is low.
To analyze how people actually behave in this situation, we ran a lab
experiment in order to test our theoretical results. Below we describe our
experimental set-up.
5.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
In our experiment we used a two-player feedback game.8 In this game we had
two types of players, namely principals and agents. They played in matched
groups, each consisting of one principal and one agent.9 All subjects played
15 rounds and a round consisted of two periods each. The agents ability was
determined by a random draw before each round and remained constant over
the two periods of a round. It was common knowledge, that the ability could
take value 2 or 6 with equal probability hence  = 0:5. In the rst period the
agent was asked to choose an e¤ort level out of the set f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8g.
For each e¤ort level the agent had to bear the respective costs presented by
the quadratic cost function c (e) = 1
2
e2. After the rst period the principal
observed the agents rst period decision and learned his actual ability i.e.
the true realization of the random draw. Then the principal could choose
one out of three messages to provide information to the agent:
 The actual ability is 2.
 The actual ability is 6.
 No message.
8Mohnen and Pokorny (2005) present a similar game in a lab experiment but as they
merely analyze the agents e¤ort decision as a reaction to performance feedback they do
not introduce principals.
9Each player kept his role, either principal or agent, over all rounds.
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After the agent had received the selected message the second period
started. The agent was again asked to select an e¤ort level out of the set
described above with the corresponding costs. After that both players were
informed about their individual payo¤s in the rst and the second period and
the total payo¤ of the particular round. The agents payo¤ for each period
of a round was calculated according to
A = a  e  1
2
e2 + 16
with a being the actual ability and e the selected e¤ort level. Thus, the agent
was compensated by a linear incentive contract with a piece rate  = 1 and
a xed payment of 16. For the principal the payo¤ for each period was
P = (   )  a  e:
Hence, the output produced by a  e is multiplied by a return factor .
Note that payo¤s of all players only depend on the e¤ort choice as there
are no direct monetary costs of feedback for the principal, neither for giving
true feedback information nor for lying. Thus, if there are costs of lying they
would be only indirect personal or psychological costs. Obviously, it is in the
principals best interest that the agent exerts higher e¤ort levels. However,
for each possible realization of ability there is an inner solution maximizing
the agents objective function. If the agent knows that the true ability level is
6 (2), his best answer is to choose an e¤ort level of 6 (2). A priori the agents
best e¤ort choice is 4 as both values of the ability are equally probable.
The parameterization varied between conditions to test our theoretical
results. Hence, in the baseline condition the principalsnet return    was
equal to 2.10 In the low return condition we set the return factor  to a lower
level, i.e.   = 1:5: In both conditions principals and agents were matched
10In one session of the baseline condition we had 30 subjects so no subject was to play
with the same counterpart twice since we played 15 rounds. In the other session of the
baseline condition we only had 28 subjects. In that case it happened that subjects were
matched who had been counterparts before. However, as no one ever knew to whom he
was matched and whether and when he was matched to that person again, we do not
believe that this had an inuence on our results.
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to a new anonymous counterpart after each round. We also tested a third
condition, which we call partners condition, without new matching. We will
refer to this in Section 5.5.4.
Altogether 172 students of various faculties participated in the experi-
ments. For the recruitment of the participants we again used the online
recruitment system by Greiner (2003). All sessions were run at the Cologne
Laboratory for Economic Research, University of Cologne in November 2005
and January 2006. We used the experimental software z-tree by Fischbacher
(1999) for programming the experiment. The procedure was such that the
participants were given oral instructions by the experimenter which were ac-
companied by several presentation slides including screen shots. After that
each subject went into an own cabin in which the computer terminal was
placed. In addition to the oral instructions the subjects received short printed
instructions which were laid out in each cabin.11 After the last round of the
experiment subjects were requested to complete a questionnaire including an
instrument measuring the individuals Machiavellianism developed by Hen-
ning and Six (1977).12 In the experiment we used tokens where each token
was worth 0:167e. For paying the subjects, one round was drawn by lot.
The sum of both periodsprots of that round was paid out at the end of
the sessions. Additionally, all subjects received a show up fee of 2:50e in-
dependent of the number of tokens gained. Subjects earned approximately
12e on average. The whole procedure took about 90 minutes.
5.4 Hypotheses
In the rst periods only the agents make decisions. We predict that they
choose the optimal e¤ort level of 4 which corresponds to the a priori expected
value of the ability. This should be the case in all conditions (Hypothesis 1).
Featuring pooling and separating equilibria, the signaling game does not
provide clear predictions for how the subjects might react in the second pe-
riods unless we know the actual costs of lying l. In the case where individual
11For the printed instructions see appendix.
12The details concerning this instrument are described in Section 5.5.2.
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costs of lying are relatively low, we are more likely to observe a pooling equi-
librium in which principals lie to their agents when their true ability is low.
That is, regardless of the true ability, the principals report that the true
ability is 6 and there are no di¤erences in feedback behavior between rounds
with di¤erent abilities. In this case, in line with Proposition 8, the agents
should stick to an e¤ort level of 4 in the second period according to the a
priori expected value of their ability (Hypothesis 2).
Conversely, if the costs of lying are relatively high, the principals might
act honestly even if the true ability is low (Proposition 7). In that case we
should observe di¤erences in the principalsfeedback behavior between those
rounds when they encounter agents with an ability of 2 and those with a true
ability of 6. Hence, the agents should adjust their e¤ort decision in period
t = 2. After receiving the feedback that the actual ability is 2, the optimal
e¤ort choice should be 2, and when being told that the actual ability is 6,
the second period e¤ort should equal 6 (Hypothesis 3).
Note that apart from the costs of lying, principals should ex ante pre-
fer the separating equilibrium with an expected second period payo¤ of
20 (   ) for the principal whereas in the pooling equilibrium the expected
second period payo¤ is 16 (   ).
According to Corollary 10 and Gneezy (2005) we should observe more
honesty when the principals return to the agents e¤ort is lower. Conse-
quently, there should be di¤erences in the feedback behavior of subjects in
the baseline and the low return condition. And in turn, the agents should be
more likely to trust their principals resulting in more frequent adjustments
of their second period e¤ort levels in the low return condition compared to
the baseline condition results (Hypothesis 4).
5.5 Empirical Findings
5.5.1 Descriptive Results
Let us rst consider some descriptive results to get a rst impression of the
empirical outcomes. With regard to the principals the interesting question
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Baseline Low return
No feedback :047 :067
Negative feedback (lie) :022 :008
Positive feedback :931 :925
Table 5.1: Feedback decisions across conditions when ability was high
Baseline Low return
No feedback :310 :152
Negative feedback :227 :210
Positive feedback (lie) :463 :649
Table 5.2: Feedback decisions across conditions when ability was low
is obviously: what kind of feedback did the respective subject send to her
agent? As each principal has three options regarding this decision, namely no
feedback, negative feedback and positive feedback, we di¤erentiate between
these three options in the analysis. Still, it is important to consider under
which circumstances the principal chose the respective option, i.e. if the true
ability was low or high. Hence, we give statistics on the feedback behavior
conditional on the true ability. Table 5.1 presents the fraction of no feed-
back, negative feedback and positive feedback, for the baseline and the low
return conditions over all subjects and all rounds given that the true ability
was high. According to Table 5.1 giving positive feedback was chosen much
more often than the other two options if the true ability was high. That is,
in both conditions almost all subjects gave feedback truthfully. Hence, sub-
jects obviously consider positive feedback to be the most attractive option
to choose independent of the condition they are in. In the low ability case,
the results look di¤erent as shown in Table 5.2. In this case most principals
gave positive feedback although the true ability is low which is deceptive.
Moreover, the no feedback message is sent much more often than it is with
high ability indicating that the principals use this option to avoid telling lies.
Let us now consider the agentse¤ort decisions. In the rst period of each
round subjects do not have any information on the actual ability realization.
But agents can condition their second period e¤ort decision on the feedback
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Baseline Low return
1st period e¤ort 3:96 (1:64) 3:87 (1:52)
2nd period e¤ort/no feedback 2:89 (1:30) 3:58 (1:72)
2nd period e¤ort/negative feedback 2:43 (1:08) 2:52 (1:46)
2nd period e¤ort/positive feedback 5:04 (1:79) 4:37 (2:07)
Table 5.3: Agentse¤ort decisions (standard deviation in parentheses)
information received between periods. According to our theory, this feedback
might make a di¤erence and therefore we present the second period e¤orts
separately for positive and negative feedback in Table 5.3. In the rst periods
the average e¤ort level chosen by the agents was almost 4 which is close
to the theoretical prediction as described in Hypothesis 1.13 In the second
periods the selected e¤orts indeed di¤er depending on the feedback observed.
The second period e¤ort seems to be higher when positive feedback was
given compared to the cases when no or negative feedback was given. In the
following sections we will analyze the data in detail and interpret the results.
5.5.2 The Existence of Costs of Lying
Do Principals Su¤er from Costs of Lying?
Our rst question is: do costs of lying even exist? As discussed above,
the principals might have an incentive to report that the agents ability is
high even though his true ability is low. If the agents trust their principals
naively, the latter benet from lying in low ability cases. In contrast there is
no obvious advantage to deception in high ability cases.
To examine whether principals indeed su¤er from costs of lying, we con-
sidered the feedback decision separately depending on whether the actual
ability is low or high in the baseline condition. The rst column of Table
5.1 supports the argument we o¤ered in the last paragraph. Around 93% of
the principals gave positive and thus honest feedback if their agent showed
high ability in the baseline condition. For the low ability case (Table 5.2,
13Testing whether the means are di¤erent from 4 with a two-sided t-test, we nd signif-
icant di¤erences for neither condition.
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rst column), the fraction of honest feedback is much lower. Here only about
23% of the agents received honest negative feedback. Principals gave positive
feedback substantially more often to high ability than to low ability agents,
despite the incentive to always give positive feedback independent of the ac-
tual ability. Hence, we suppose that principals do consider the true ability
value when deciding what feedback to give and there are at least some hon-
est principals among our subjects. Indeed, there seem to be costs of lying,
although here they are not monetary but instead subjective psychological
costs.
However, not all of the principals always give positive feedback when the
true ability is high. There are two possible causes, one technical and one
theoretical, for this scenario: First, it suggests that some of the subjects
did not understand the design of the game and therefore made mistakes
accordingly. Second, they might have consciously chosen to lie or to give
no feedback for high ability because they thought that the agents would not
believe the positive feedback anyway.
To further analyze our data, we use variables for each principal in the
sample reecting the individual feedback behavior. As we want to grasp in-
formation from all rounds, we computed the fraction of cases in which a
particular principal chose to give positive feedback when the true ability was
low (recall that the mean of this variable over all subjects is :46, see Table
5.2, rst column). However, if the actual ability is low, positive feedback is,
of course, a deception. We also determined the fraction of positive feedback
messages for each principal when the true ability was high which gives a rate
of truthful feedback to the agents (recall that the mean of this variable over
all subjects is :93, see Table 5.1, rst column).
Signicant di¤erences between these fraction variables for each individual
would imply that there is some obstacle deterring principals from deceiving
their agents if the true ability is low. As these two variables are dependent,
we analyze the di¤erences between these kinds of feedback behavior by ap-
plying the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank test for dependent samples.
The results indicate that principals make use of the positive feedback option
highly signicantly more often if the true ability is high (absolute z-value
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4:648).14 From that we may conclude that subjects indeed consider the ac-
tual ability and have a preference for being honest to their agent. This result
may imply that at least some principals choose strategies corresponding to a
separating equilibrium which is described in Hypothesis 2.15
Are There Certain Types of Principals?
According to the theory the costs of lying play a crucial role in the principals
feedback decisions. Consequently it is important to learn more about these
costs. It would be interesting to know whether principals select a certain
strategy at the beginning and stick to it all over the game such that we can
determine certain types of principals. If so, we could distinguish players who
lie whenever it seems protable to them from those who never lie. Figure
5.1 shows the percentage of lies across all low ability rounds per principal.
Obviously, there are some principals in both conditions whose fraction of
dishonest feedback is zero. Hence, they never lied when the agents actual
ability was low throughout the game. A zero rate of lying does not mean,
however, that the respective subject always revealed the true ability as cases
in which the subject gave no feedback are included. In the baseline condition
there are more principals who never lied than in the low return condition. In
turn, in the low return condition we nd far more principals with a lie rate of
one. These are subjects who lied each time when the actual ability was low.
We might claim that these principals have lower costs of lying and therefore
played the pooling equilibrium (Hypothesis 2). So we have some subjects
who are steadfast regarding the strategy they chose such that they either
never lied or always lied with low ability. However, there are other types
of players that apparently changed their strategy over rounds. They have
fractions of lies strictly greater than zero but strictly smaller than one. The
individual behavior of those mixing subjects is presented in Figure 5.3 and
14For the low return and partners condition we nd a similar relationship with absolute
z-values of 3:572 and 4:510 respectively.
15With Proposition 7 and the parametrization of the experiment, we can calculate that
false feedback (i.e. deception) in case that the true ability is low increases the principals
payo¤ by 16. Consequently, we can compute that the disultility from lying must be higher
than 16 for subjects giving feedback honestly.
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Figure 5.1: Fraction of lies per principal (if ability was low)
5.4 in the appendix. It seems that there is no systematic behavioral pattern
in the data. Thus, it remains unclear why they changed their strategy.
To further analyze the types of principals we observed in the experiment,
we look at the subjectsMachiavellianism scores to nd out whether the
degree of Machiavellianism can explain the individuals feedback behavior.
In social psychology the notion of Machiavellianism denotes personality traits
reecting manipulativeness, egoism and the attitude that the end justies the
means and was rst established by Christie and Geis (1970). Psychological
tests to measure Machiavellianism have been used before to predict behavior
in trust games (see Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002)). In order to measure the
subjectsMachiavellianism we used an instrument by Henning and Six (1977)
consisting of 18 items which are answered on a 6-point response scale (where 1
denotes strong disagreement and 6 strong agreement). The human traits that
are covered by Machiavellianism suggest that individuals with higher scores
have lower costs of lying and hence we use it as a proxy for the individual
costs of lying. We test the inuence of the Machiavellianism score on the
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Lie
Machiavellianism 0.338**
score (0.14)
Partners -0.894***
(0.26)
Low return 0.465*
(0.24)
High ability -1.664***
(0.37)
Constant -1.693***
(0.45)
Observations 1290
Number of subject 86
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Round dummies included
Table 5.4: Results random e¤ects probit estimation
decision to lie with random e¤ects probit estimation. The results are shown
in Table 5.4. Partnersis a dummy variable with value one if the subject
was in the partners condition and zero otherwise. Analogously low return
is a dummy variable with value one for the low return condition and zero
otherwise. The dummy variable high abilitytakes the value one if the actual
ability in the respective round was high and zero if it was low. The model
in Table 5.4 shows that indeed a subjects probability to lie increases with
a higher Machiavellianism score. Thus, we may conclude that the test we
used measures to a certain extend the psychological costs of lying a subjects
su¤ers from.
Do Agents Consider the Feedback Information?
In the theory section we showed that feedback can be an informative signal
on the agents ability if there are su¢ ciently high costs of lying. The exper-
imental data provide evidence that these psychological costs might exist in
laboratory settings as well. However, whether and how signaling works out
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strongly depends on the agentsbeliefs. Those beliefs in turn have an impact
on the agentsreaction, i.e. they inuence what the agents consider to be
their best response in terms of their second period e¤ort. Hence, we tested
the impact of the type of feedback observed by the agents on their second
period e¤ort decision. To do so, we looked at the baseline condition e¤ort
data and compare the means of second period e¤ort conditional on the previ-
ous feedback. According to Table 5.3, there was a mean e¤ort of 2:98 for no
feedback, 2:43 for negative feedback, and 5:04 for positive feedback for the
baseline condition. As each agent chose his second period e¤ort 15 times,
the observations are dependent and therefore, we again use the Wilcoxon
matched pairs sign rank test. The di¤erence between second period e¤orts
after observing no feedback versus negative feedback is weakly signicant
(absolute z-value 1:826). Thus, we might draw the conclusion that agents
on average believe that low feedback is a stronger indicator for low ability
than no feedback. The e¤ort levels selected by the agents after receiving no
feedback and positive feedback messages respectively, demonstrates a highly
signicant di¤erence (absolute z-value 4:348). Thus, positive feedback in-
creases second period e¤orts considerably compared to no feedback. We nd
a stronger result between second period e¤orts while comparing negative and
positive feedback. Hence, the Wilcoxon matched pairs sign rank test again
shows a highly signicant result (absolute z-value 4:212).16
Altogether the results support the conclusion that agents use the feed-
back information when adjusting their second period e¤orts and the change
corresponds to the message they received from their principals. In particular,
it indicates that some agents and some principals (as shown in the previous
chapter) play a separating equilibrium. Otherwise the agentse¤ort adjust-
ment would not di¤er between positive and negative feedback. Thus, agents
seem to believe that they receive di¤erent feedback information for di¤erent
actual abilities and in turn, they react di¤erently to positive, negative and
no feedback respectively.
16The test results for all conditions are presented in Table 5.8 in the appendix.
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5.5.3 Does Deception Increase with Higher Returns?
Although we showed in the last section that costs of lying appear in both
the baseline and the low return condition there may be di¤erences in the
strength of the cost e¤ect. It seems especially intuitive that deception rises
as it becomes more benecial. Gneezy (2005) and Corollary 10 imply that
the probability of observing deception is higher when the returns on lying
increase. To test whether the theoretical result is valid, we compare the
occurrence of lies in the baseline and low return condition. As the principals
return on the agents e¤ort is higher in the baseline condition principals
should have stronger incentives to make their agents increase their e¤ort.
Hence, if the principals expect lying (i.e. giving positive feedback even if
the actual ability is low) to have a positive impact on the agents e¤ort
decision, they would be more likely to lie in the baseline than in the low
return condition. To test this we used the fraction of dishonest feedback
that each principal sent to his agents compared to all feedback decisions.
Table 5.1 shows that, when the true ability was high, the fractions of lies
were very low for both conditions. This is not surprising as deception is not
very attractive in that case (mean :02 and :01; see Table 5.1, second row).
Running a pairwise comparison with the Mann-Whitney-U-test for those
rounds with high ability the data do not highlight any signicant di¤erences.
When the actual ability was low, principals in the baseline condition lied less
(mean :46, see Table 5.2, third row, rst column) than those in the low return
condition (mean :65; see Table 5.2, third row, second column), a result that
contrasts the theoretical prediction in Corollary 10. Here, we nd a weakly
signicant di¤erence (absolute z-value 1:900) between the baseline and the
low return condition applying the Mann-Whitney-U-test. Consequently, we
conclude that there is at least some weak evidence in the data that increasing
returns on lying diminish false feedback, and this contradicts our Hypothesis
4. Hence, the separating equilibrium is less likely to occur in the low return
condition than in the baseline condition as described in Corollary 10.
Our model and the results in Gneezy (2005) would lead us to predict
higher lying rates for the baseline condition than for the low return condition
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because higher returns feature the pooling equilibrium in which all types
report high ability. As we observe the opposite pattern we conclude that
cutting returns from lying does not necessarily enhance honesty.17
The question of why this might be the case is important. There are
several possible explanations of which we will discuss two. The rst refers
to social preferences, in particular inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). According to the inequity aversion the-
ory, inequity in payo¤s leads to disutility. As discussed in Chapter 4 this
approach has been shown to explain several deviations from purely rational
behavioral patterns (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), Engelmann and Strobel (2004)). In our
design principals and agents were treated and paid o¤ inequitably. On av-
erage, the principals earned more than the agents and both parties could
compute this as they knew their counterpartscomplete payo¤ function. As
the marginal returns on the agentse¤ort were higher for the principals in the
baseline condition there was more inequality in payo¤s in the baseline than
in the low return condition. Deception, however, decreased the agentspayo¤
in favor of the principals. Therefore principals might have refrained from
lying to their agents because they realized that they were in a better position
anyway and thus they tried to reduce inequality in the baseline condition.
Another possible explanation might be that the principals have reference
dependent preferences. Recall that reference dependency suggests that in-
dividuals do not only appreciate the absolute height of the payo¤s but also
its height compared to a reference point. Payo¤s smaller (greater) than the
reference point are perceived as losses (gains). Loss aversion then captures
the idea that marginal utility gains below the reference point are higher than
above it. That is, utility gains above the reference point lose relative value.
Due to the higher returns on e¤ort, the principals earn more in the baseline
condition than in the low return condition for a given e¤ort level of the agent.
If our subjects were loss averse and the reference point was on average ex-
17Besides, giving no feedback seems to be used to avoid lying if the true ability is low. It
appears that principals prefer giving no feedback to deceiving and saying the truth. Yet,
most of the agents adequately react to this by decreasing their e¤ort.
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Low ability High ability
No feedback :175 :065
Negative feedback :646 :014 (lie)
Positive feedback :180 (lie) :921
Table 5.5: Feedback decisions in the partners condition
ceeded in the baseline condition, they might have refrained from lying as the
costs of lying were too high compared to the lower utility gains they could
have realized. In turn, as they were on average below the reference point,
principals in the low return condition could realize higher marginal returns
and therefore it was worth to bear the costs of deception.
5.5.4 Long Term Relationships
Unlike in our experiment, however, employer-employee relationships are typ-
ically long term relations. Therefore the opportunity to build up reputation
might play an important role in real life situations (e.g. Sobel (1985), Wilson
and Sell (1997) or Hermalin (1998) study reputation in cheap talk games). So
we introduced a partners condition where we did not newly match subjects
for all 15 rounds and as a consequence allowed principal agent pairs to build
up a reputation over time. As in the baseline condition, we chose     = 2
in the partners condition. Hence, we compare these two conditions to gure
out the e¤ect of long term relationships.
For the partners condition, it seems plausible that the principals act more
honestly compared to those in the baseline condition as they can build up
reputation to be reliable partners over rounds (see Sobel (1985) for a theory
of credibility). The results are displayed in Table 5.5. For the baseline
condition, we nd that when the true ability was low most principals gave
positive (i.e. deceptive) feedback. In contrast, in the partners condition, 65%
of all feedback is negative for low ability which means that most subjects gave
honest feedback.
Due to reputational concerns we would expect principals to su¤er more
from lying in the partners condition. However, in both conditions, baseline
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Baseline Partners
1st period e¤ort 3:96 (1:64) 3:69 (1:54)
2nd period e¤ort/no feedback 2:89 (1:30) 2:53 (1:16)
2nd period e¤ort/negative feedback 2:43 (1:08) 2:54 (:97)
2nd period e¤ort/positive feedback 5:04 (1:79) 5:74 (1:83)
Table 5.6: Agentse¤ort decisions (standard deviation in parentheses)
and partners, principals refrained from giving positive feedback highly sig-
nicantly more often if the true ability was low (partners condition: absolute
z-value 4:510).
5.5.5 More Honesty and Trust in Long Term Relation-
ships?
Intuitively one might argue that lies destroy trust and this is likely to af-
fect the results in future rounds. In this section, we investigate how decep-
tion inuences the agentstrust in the principalsfeedback messages. From
the experimental literature (e.g. Camerer and Weigelt (1988), Bohnet and
Huck (2004), Gächter and Falk (2002) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2004), for
an overview see Andreoni and Croson (2004)) we know that reputation is
an important and powerful mechanism in enhancing cooperation and trust.
Hence, we examine whether the fraction of dishonest feedback is lower when
reputation can be built up. For this purpose we compare the principalsfeed-
back behavior in the baseline and the partners condition. For the aggregate
fraction of lies we nd that subjects in the baseline condition lie more (:46)
than those in the partners condition (:18) if the actual ability is low. Run-
ning a Mann-Whitney-U-test we nd that the di¤erence is highly signicant
(absolute z-value 2:904). This implies that from an aggregate point of view
long term relationships as applied in the partners condition indeed encourage
subjects to act more honestly. When compared, the di¤erence between the
dishonesty of feedback in the baseline and the partners condition for high
ability is very small and insignicant (baseline :022 vs. partners condition
:014). Whether this increase in honesty facilitated by long term partnership
111
is useful in that the principals substantially benet, depends on the agents
trust in the feedback information. Intuitively, one might argue that more
honesty should induce agents to trust more. The descriptive statistics are
presented in Table 5.6. Looking at the agentse¤ort reactions we nd that
agents react rather reluctant if given no feedback. In the baseline condition
they choose an average e¤ort level of 2:89 and 2:53 in the partners condition.
This di¤erence between conditions is small and insignicant but supports the
conclusion that the agents interpreted no feedback as a signal of low ability.
For negative feedback, the agents selected an average e¤ort level of 2:43 in the
baseline and 2:54 in the partners condition. Again, there are no signicant
di¤erences between the conditions. However, agents in the baseline condi-
tion responded with an average e¤ort level of 5:04 to positive feedback while
subjects in the partners condition even exerted an average of 5:74. This dif-
ference indicates that agents in the partners condition trust more than those
in the baseline and this is signicant (absolute z-value 2:568) applying the
Mann-Whitney-U-test. Hence, it seems that in the baseline condition the
increased number of deceptions leads to more distrust in positive feedback
resulting in lower average second period e¤ort levels. This therefore seems
to be the obverse of deception. Lies enable the principals to realize higher
prots in rounds with low ability but the agents learn about that and positive
feedback becomes less credible even if it is true.
In order to disentangle these e¤ects, we use the data of the baseline
and partners condition to explain the agentssecond period e¤ort by several
independent variables in a random e¤ects regression. The estimation results
are presented in Table 5.7. Baselineis a dummy variable with value one for
the baseline condition and zero for the partners condition. Positive feedback
is a dummy variable with value one if the respective agent was given positive
feedback in the respective round and zero otherwise. In our opinion positive
feedback seems to be the most attractive and therefore the least credible
action the principal can take. Analogously no feedbackis a dummy variable
with value one if the agent was given no feedback in the respective round
and zero otherwise. When the agent was given negative feedback in a round
both feedback dummies (positive and no feedback) would be zero. To check
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for past experiences, we included a variable fraction of past lieswhich is the
proportion of lies in previous rounds that the agent experienced up to the
current round. Hence, it is the running sum of lies divided by the number of
previous rounds, the agent experienced in the past.
Model (1) shows that the condition does not inuence the e¤ort decision
in the second periods per se. We may conclude that the agents indeed react to
the positive feedback information observing that the variable positive feed-
backleads to a highly signicant increase in second period e¤ort which is not
surprising. The e¤ect is similar but less pronounced for no feedback. How-
ever, agents also seem to be sensitive toward past experiences. The coe¢ cient
for fraction of past liesis negative and highly signicant demonstrating that
agents choose lower levels of second period e¤ort if they have been lied to
more often in the past. Obviously, agents refrain from higher e¤ort levels
fearing that the feedback information might be untrue in the current round
again. Still, past experiences should only have an impact on the second pe-
riod e¤ort if positive feedback is given. Giving no feedback does not contain
any information at all where lying by giving negative feedback (in case the
actual ability is high) is not very attractive and therefore is rarely used. So
in the latter cases of feedback one cannot draw any conclusions from previous
lies. To check whether this is the case, we include interaction terms in model
(2) controlling for the e¤ect of fraction of past liesfor positive feedback and
no feedback. The coe¢ cient for the interaction of positive feedback and the
fraction of lies in previous rounds is negative and highly signicant. This
indicates that indeed past lies destroy the credibility of positive feedback.
This is not the case for no feedback where the coe¢ cient for the interaction
term is small and insignicant. Note also that the direct e¤ect of fraction of
past liesdisappears in this regression model. However, some variables might
have fairly di¤erent implications for the particular agent depending on the
condition he is in. To control for the e¤ect that (some of) the independent
variables might have di¤erent impacts in the two conditions, we introduce
several interaction terms.
In models 3 and 4 we show specications including these interaction terms
in addition. The most important di¤erence between the two conditions seems
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
E¤ort period 2
Baseline -0.0953 -0.0217 -0.217 -0.156
(0.25) (0.25) (0.33) (0.35)
Positive feedback 2.957*** 3.403*** 3.487*** 3.513***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18)
No feedback 0.499*** 0.189 -0.0115 0.0269
(0.16) (0.19) (0.23) (0.25)
Fraction of past lies -2.454*** -0.663 -1.919*** -1.620*
(0.34) (0.52) (0.71) (0.89)
Positive feedback*fraction of past lies -3.513*** -3.262*** -3.621***
(0.57) (0.62) (0.94)
No feedback*fraction of past lies 0.895 0.691 0.210
(0.76) (0.79) (1.24)
Positive feedback*baseline -0.165 -0.246
(0.25) (0.30)
No feedback*baseline 0.416 0.308
(0.34) (0.40)
Fraction of past lies*baseline 1.800*** 1.301
(0.65) (1.10)
Positive feedback*baseline* 0.626
fraction of past lies (1.25)
No feedback*baseline* 0.811
fraction of past lies (1.61)
Constant 2.906*** 2.882*** 2.983*** 2.962***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
Observations 840 840 840 840
Number of subjects 56 56 56 56
Standard errors in parentheses, round dummies included
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 5.7: Results of random e¤ects estimation
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to be the interaction of fraction of past liesand baselinewhere the coef-
cient is positive and highly signicant. This outcome is intuitively clear
since fraction of past liesis more meaningful if based on one single princi-
pal rather than on many ever changing ones. In the partners condition, the
agent can conclude from a high number of previously experienced lies that
his principal is not a very honest partner since he remains the same person
all over the game. Still, the conclusion should be less strong in the baseline
condition as experiences with past principals do not necessarily lead to good
predictions of the behavior of future principals. Although it is useful to up-
date the expectation of the behavior of the whole principal population, it is
less meaningful with regard to the behavior of a particular individual whose
behavior has not been observed beforehand.
To conclude, we have seen that a lie has two major e¤ects. First, in the
short run a lie leads to higher second period e¤orts in the round in which
it was told. Second, it diminishes future impacts to positive feedback in
the long run. In case of the partners matching this does harm the liars
own future utility. In the baseline condition future principals su¤er from a
negative long term e¤ect if matched to an agent who has been lied to in the
past similar to an external e¤ect of deception. These results generate another
important issue: in this context, is lying benecial for the principal after all
if we consider both e¤ects together, and what is the e¤ect of deception on
social welfare?
5.5.6 Is More Honesty Protable and if so, for Whom?
Let us rst consider the agentspayo¤s displayed in Figure 5.2. The left part
of the gure shows that the agentsmean payo¤ in the rst periods is quite
similar across the baseline and the partners conditions. Using the Mann-
Whitney-U-test we do not nd any signicant di¤erences. However, the left
part of the gure also illustrates the agentsmean payo¤in the second periods
after the principals have made their feedback decisions. Obviously agents in
the partners condition (which has been shown to enhance honesty) yield on
average higher payo¤s than those in the baseline and this is highly signicant
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with the Mann-Whitney-U-test (absolute z-value 2:715). If we run the same
analysis for total payo¤s (sum of payo¤ in rst and second periods) we nd a
similar but less pronounced result (absolute z-value 1:656). These outcomes
support the hypothesis that the agents in total benet more from honesty in
the relationship as true feedback allows them to make more optimal e¤ort de-
cisions in the second periods. With regard to the principalspayo¤s, the right
Figure 5.2: Mean prots for principals and agents
part of Figure 5.2 shows the mean payo¤s in the rst and second periods ag-
gregated over all rounds. Again, the rst period payo¤s hardly di¤er between
the two conditions and this is insignicant at any conventional level. Yet,
when considering the second periods, we observe weakly signicantly higher
payo¤s in the partners condition (absolute z-value 1:657). This implies that
even the principals benet from the lower level of deception occurring in the
partners condition. However, in terms of total payo¤s the di¤erence is no
longer signicant. Nevertheless, we nd weak evidence for a positive e¤ect of
reputation and resulting honesty on the principalsaggregate payo¤s in the
second periods.
116
The outcomes described above are interesting as deception in the short
run seems to be more attractive. But, as we have shown in the previous
chapter, deception causes the credibility of feedback to decrease. This in
turn induces agents to reject positive feedback even if true. Therefore the
positive e¤ect of true positive feedback (when the actual ability is high)
diminishes. Hence, more honesty indirectly leads to an increase in payo¤s
for the principals. Finally, we may conclude that honesty seems to raise social
welfare as it not only features a strong positive impact on the agentssecond
period payo¤but also a weak positive impact on the principalssecond period
payo¤. Both parties seem to benet from reputational systems enhancing
honesty.
5.6 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter we have theoretically and experimentally examined the role of
the principals feedback honesty in a framework in which the agents actual
ability is uncertain. As the agents monetary payo¤ is output-based his
optimal e¤ort level increases with his ability. The model posits that the
principal (who is the only one to know the true ability) might prefer to lie to
the agent about his ability. In particular she might tell the agent that he has
high ability even when, in reality, the agent has low ability because there are
su¢ ciently low costs associated with lying. In that case we obtain a pooling
equilibrium and the true ability is not revealed. In turn, for higher costs of
lying separating equilibria become feasible.
The experimental outcomes show that some principals seem to play sep-
arating strategies which indicates that costs of lying indeed exist. Further,
we are able to distinguish the steadfastly honest from the steadfastly deceiv-
ing as well as mark the principals who vacillate. Hence, we conclude that
for some people deception is associated with costs, even if the costs are not
monetary but instead are driven by a reluctance to break religious or ethical
rules or the threat of a bad conscience. Although deception is widespread,
the agents adjust their e¤ort according to the received feedback information
and thus increase the principalspayo¤s in the respective round. Still, past
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experiences of deception undermine the agents trust in the feedback they
receive. That is, the impact of the feedback information on the agentsef-
fort decreases with the number of lies the latter has previously experienced.
Hence, we might say that deception has serious and measurable external
e¤ects.
Surprisingly, decreased incentives to lie do not induce principals to act
more honestly. Instead, we observe the opposite pattern as deception rates
even rise. This contradicts not only our theoretical prediction but also ob-
servations in Gneezy (2005). As lower incentives to lie come along with
lower payo¤s of the principals, the more aggressive lying behavior might be
explained by alternative approaches such as inequity aversion or reference
dependency and loss aversion.
Additionally, we nd strong evidence that long term relationships en-
hance honesty due to reputational concerns. In long term partnerships the
principals make use of deception less often. Furthermore the agents react
much more sensitively toward past experiences of deception if they interact
with the same principal continuously. In this case the principals harm them-
selves by lying to their agent. This shows that indeed lies have a negative
long term e¤ect in continuous partnerships leading to more honesty.
Finally, both, our theoretical results and our experimental data show that
being honest is worthwhile in the long run. Then, both parties benet if the
true ability is revealed. So, if the principal was able to commit himself to
being honest to the agent in the future this would lead to an increase in
welfare.
Even if we neglect any social or ethical aspects of honesty and deception,
employers and employees are ex-ante better o¤ with truthful performance
feedback because it yields higher economic payo¤s. Thus, we can indeed
conclude that honesty is the best policy.
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5.7 Appendix to Chapter 5
Proof. Proposition 7: First we will refer to the separating equilibrium
in which the principal is always honest, so we can describe her strategy
as (fL; fH). The expression to the left (right) of the comma refers to the
principals choice of action if the true ability is low (high) in the following.
Hence, if the agent receives negative feedback he will know that his true
ability is low. Therefore he will choose e = aL  eL. Analogously, if the
agent observes positive feedback fH he will be sure that his actual ability
is high and exert an e¤ort level according to e = aH  eH . When the
agent observes no feedback f0 o¤ the equilibrium path his reaction function
is dened by e(e) =  [eaH + (1  e) aL] and therefore a function of his
belief e, that the true ability is high. To ensure that the principal indeed
plays (fL; fH) without incentive to deviate in equilibrium, his strategy must
be optimal. Thus, in case of a = aL,
(   )aLeL  (   )aLeH   l
l  aL [eH   eL] (   ) (5.6)
must be valid. This is the case, if costs of lying l are su¢ ciently high. In the
case of a = aH the corresponding condition is:
(   )aHeH  (   )aHeL   l
l   (   )aH (eH   eL) (5.7)
Condition (5.7) is always met as the right hand side is strictly negative, but
the costs of lying are at least zero. Yet, the principal can also deviate o¤ the
equilibrium path by choosing f0. If the true ability is low a = aL, she faces
the following condition:
(   )aLeL  (   )aL [eeH + (1  e) eL]e  0 (5.8)
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Condition (5.8) can only be met when the agents belief that the true ability
is high e equals zero. In the case where the true ability is high we obtain the
condition:
(   )aHeH  (   )aH [eeH + (1  e) eL]
1  e (5.9)
It is obvious that this condition is always met. Therefore the respective
separating equilibrium does exist if conditions (5.6) and (5.8) hold. However,
when there are no costs of lying (that is l = 0) the inequality (5.6) is never
fullled and this equilibrium could not exist.
Proof. Proposition 8: In the pooling equilibrium described in Proposition
8 the principal always chooses to give positive feedback fH regardless of the
actual ability. Hence, the agent chooses e = e in equilibrium. For a = aL
the principals utility is (   )aLe   l. When she deviates and plays fL or
f0 she receives (   )aL [eeH + (1  e) eL]. Thus she faces the condition:
(   )aLe  l  (   )aL [eeH + (1  e) eL]
[eH   eL] (   ) (   e) aL  l (5.10)
For a = aH the principal yields (   )aHe in equilibrium and
(   )aH [eeH + (1  e) eL] if she deviates to f0:
(   )aHe  (   )aH [eeH + (1  e) eL]
  e (5.11)
But, she can as well choose fL o¤ the equilibrium path. Then, the corre-
sponding condition is:
(   )aHe  (   )aH [eeH + (1  e) eL]  l
[eH   eL] [   e] (   )aH   l (5.12)
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So in equilibrium conditions (5.10) to (5.12) must hold.
Proof. Proposition 9: To show that the separating equilibria are e¢ cient,
we compare the sums of the ex ante expected utilities of agent and principal
in a separating equilibrium with the most e¢ cient pooling equilibrium. The
latter is the pooling equilibrium in which no feedback is given as no signaling
costs arise. It does not matter which separating equilibrium is selected for
comparison as they all result in the same utilities for agent and principal,
respectively. Moreover, we only consider the second period because the rst
periods outcomes are the same for all types of equilibria. The sum of both
partiesex ante expected utility is
E

UA2

+ E

W P2

= 

2aHa

+ (1  ) 2aLa  1
2
2a2
+ [(   ) aHa] + (1  ) [(   ) aLa]
= 2a(aH + (1  ) aL)| {z }
a
  1
2
2a2 + (   ) a (aH + (1  ) aL)
=
1
2
2a2 + (   ) a2 (5.13)
in the most e¢ cient pooling equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium it is:
E

UA2

+ E

W P2

= 

(aH)
2   1
2
2a2H

+ (1  )

(aL)
2   1
2
2a2L

+(   )   a2H + (1  ) a2L
=
2
2
 
a2H + (1  ) a2L

+ (   )   a2H + (1  ) a2L (5.14)
Social welfare is ex ante higher in the separating equilibrium if the following
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inequation indicating that (5.14) is greater than (5.13) is valid:
2
2
 
a2H + (1  ) a2L

+ (   )   a2H + (1  ) a2L
>
1
2
2a2 + (   ) a2 (5.15)
,
2
2
 
a2H + (1  ) a2L   a2

+ (   )   a2H + (1  ) a2L   a2 > 0
For (5.15) to be greater than zero, the terms in brackets have to be greater
than zero because by assumption (   ) > 0 and  > 0 :
a2H + (1  ) a2L   a2 > 0
a2H + (1  ) a2L > a2
a2H + (1  ) a2L > [aH + (1  )aL]2
According to Jensens inequality, this is true.
In addition we will analyze the remaining three equilibria existing in the
game in the following:
1. We discuss the candidate (f0; fH). Hence, the principal will not deviate
in the equilibrium for a = aL if condition (5.6) is met. In the case of
a = aH the corresponding condition is:
(   )aHeH  (   )aHeL (5.16)
eH  eL
Condition (5.16) is always met. Yet, the principal can deviate from the
equilibrium path by choosing fL. Then for a = aL:
(   )aLeL  (   )aL [eeH + (1  e) eL]e  0 (5.17)
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must hold. However, condition (5.17) can only be met when the agents
belief e that the true ability is high equals zero. Considering the case
where the true ability is high we obtain the condition:
(   )aHeH  (   )aH [eeH + (1  e) eL]  l
(   )aH (1  e) [eH   eL]   l (5.18)
It is obvious that this condition is always met if l > 0. Therefore the
respective separating equilibrium exists if conditions (5.6) and (5.17)
are met.
2. Suppose a pooling equilibrium in which all types choose to give no
feedback f0. For a = aL the principals utility is (   )aLe. When
she deviates to fL, she receives (  )aL [eeH + (1  e) eL]. Thus, she
faces the condition:
(   )aLe  (   )aL [eeH + (1  e) eL]
  e (5.19)
But she can as well play fH o¤ the equilibrium path. Then the corre-
sponding condition is:
(   )aLe  (   )aL [eeH + (1  e) eL]  l
l    (   e) [eH   eL] (   )aL (5.20)
For a = aH the principal yields (   )aHe in equilibrium and
(   )aH [eeH + (1  e) eL]  l if she deviates to fL:
(   )aHe  (   )aH [eeH + (1  e) eL]  l
l    (   e) [eH   eL] (   )aH (5.21)
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If the principals deviates to fH
(   )aHe  (   )aH [eeH + (1  e) eL]
  e (5.22)
must be met. Hence, in equilibrium conditions (5.19) to (5.22) must
hold.
3. Consider a pooling equilibrium in which fL is always chosen. If a = aL
this is optimal compared to f0 when
(   )aLe  (   )aL [eeH + (1  e) eL]
  e (5.23)
holds. But, the principal can as well give positive feedback o¤ the
equilibrium path. Then, the corresponding condition is:
(   )aLe  (   )aL [eeH + (1  e) eL]  l
l    (   e) [eH   eL] (   )aL (5.24)
For a = aH the principal yields (   )aHe   l in equilibrium and
(   )aH [eeH + (1  e) eL] if she deviates to f0 or fH :
(   )aHe  l  (   )aH [eeH + (1  e) eL]
[eH   eL] (   ) (   e) aH  l (5.25)
must be met. Hence, in equilibrium (5.23) to (5.25) must hold.
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Short Instructions (baseline condition)
Before each round starts, one Player A is matched to one Player B. Each
round consists of two periods. A factor is randomly drawn before every round
starts. The factor is unknown to Player A as well as to Player B, but can
only take the value 2 or the value 6. In 50 percent of the cases the factor is
2 and in 50 percent of the cases it is 6. Then the rst round starts:
Player A is asked to select a number between 1 and 8. For each number
he has to bear the specic cost of the number which are directly subtracted
from his account.
E¤ort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Costs of E¤ort 0:5 2:0 4:5 8:0 12:5 18:0 24:5 32:0
After that, Period 1 is nished and Player B gets to know which factor
was drawn beforehand. Player B is then asked to send a message to Player
A. In this message Player B can tell that the factor is 2 or 6. But she can
also decide not to send any message. Look at the screenshot:
   Now you can send a message to Player A
Please choose one of the following options:
I let Player A know, that the factor in this round is 2.
             I let Player A know, that the factor of this round is 6.
             I do not want to send a message to Player A.
The selected message will be send to Player A and Period 2 begins.
In Period 2, Player A is again asked to choose a number between 1 and
8. It is important to note that the random factor from Period 1 remains the
same in Period 2.
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Random draw of the factor
2. Period: Player A receives the message and chooses between 1 and 8
Player B gets to know the actual value of the factor (which is either 2 or 6)
Player B selects a message and sends it to Player A
1. Period: Player A chooses a number between 1 and 8
The players will be told the number of tokens from the two periods
For each period, both types of players receive their tokens depending on the
number that was chosen by Player A.
For Player A the tokens per period are calculated as follows:
Tokens for Player A: 16 + Factor*Number Cost of the number
For Player B the tokens per period are calculated as follows:
Tokens for Player B: 2*Factor*Number
In total, there are 15 rounds consisting of the 2 periods described above.
Before every new round starts, the factor 2 or 6 is again randomly drawn and
you will be matched to a new player to which you have not been assigned to
before. One of the rounds will be drawn by lot for your compensation of the
experiment. Both periods of this round will be paid o¤. One token is equals
0.167 Euro.
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No. vs. pos. No. vs. neg. Pos. vs. neg.
Baseline condition 4:348 1:826 4:212
Low return condition 1:458 2:351 4:288
Partners condition 3:922 0:848 4:542
Absolute z-values, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 5.8: Results Wilcoxon sign rank test
Figure 5.3: Feedback decisions baseline condition (for low ability)
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Figure 5.4: Feedback decisions low return condition (for low ability)
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